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Much of criminal law relies on proof by inference. The value of evidence frequently lies
in what it suggests as much as what it shows. An outstretched hand in a dark alley is either
an illicit drug deal or a handshake; a semi-coherent moan is either encouragement of, or
resistance to, a sexual advance; shouted words to "fuck up" a school principal could be either
a promise of harm to come or meaningless bravado. In criminal law, fact finders untangle
not only what happened, but why it happened, or perhaps more accurately, what the de-
fendant's state of mind was when it was happening. As all other superfluous facts fall away,
the question of mental state lingers as a fulcrum around which culpability swings in crimi-
nal law. Reaching the answer to the mental state question, however, is a deceptively complex
one. The fact finder must engage in an interpretive act, considering not only what can be
seen or heard as evidence, but also the significance of that testimonial or physical evidence
in real-world contexts-both the world in which the events occurred, and the fact finder's
own world. This act of interpretation seeks to give evidence meaning that the law can recognize.
Developments in neuroscience suggest that in the context of juvenile defendants, this
moment of interpretation is fraught with particular risks. The emergence of functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology has provided significant insights into adolescent
brain development and its effect on adolescent thought processes. As a result, scientists (and
courts) recognize that adolescent actors are more likely to engage in risky behavior, fail to
properly comprehend long-term consequences, and overvalue reward. In short, science has
proven what most long suspected: kids think and react differently than do adults.
Although criminal law has long accounted for this difference procedurally, particularly
in the creation of an independent juvenile justice system, there has been little exploration of
its significance in the realm of substantive criminal law. This Article argues that what is
known of adolescent brain development suggests that adult fact finders are poorly posi-
tioned to accurately assess a juvenile defendant's tate of mind. In short, current treatment
of the state of mind element is insufficient and risks inaccurate results. The current ap-
proach to assessing mental state relies on judgments by fact finders who, as adults, lack the
perspective of those whose actions and words they seek to interpret in the process of judg-
ment-juvenile defendants. Rather than asking adult fact finders to perform the impossible
task of placing themselves in an adolescent's mind, substantive criminal law should instead
acknowledge the difference in perspective between adults and adolescents. Further, it should
permit evidentiary presentation and jury instructions akin to defenses which rely on the
defendant's actual, as opposed to imagined, perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of criminal law relies on proof by inference.' The value of
evidence frequently lies in what it suggests as much as what it
shows.2 An outstretched hand in a dark alley is either an illicit drug
deal or a handshake; a semi-coherent moan is either encouragement
of, or resistance to, a sexual advance; shouted words to "fuck up" a
school principal could be either a promise of harm to come or mean-
ingless bravado. In criminal law, fact finders untangle not only what
happened, but why it happened. It is answering the "why" question-
not as a matter of motive (though motive may well be relevant), but
as a matter of the defendant's state of mind-that places an act and
1. Inferences, or presumptions, are used as synonymous terms by the courts and
scholars to describe the legal construct that permits juries to "infer an essential element of
a crime from proof of some other fact commonly associated with it." See Charles R. Nesson,
Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1187, 1187 (1979).
2. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512-13 (1979) (permitting circumstan-
tial evidence alone to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt proof requirement of mens rea
by holding "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts"). The Court's position that inference does not violate due process require-
ments by lessening the burden of proof is not without controversy. See, e.g., John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the
Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1327 (1979) (arguing that inferences, while facilitating
ease of proof, create significant constitutional concerns including lessening and/or imper-
missible shifting the burden of proof); Nesson, supra note 1, at 1187; James F. Ponsoldt, A
Due Process Analysis of Judicially-Authorized Presumptions in Federal Aggravated Bank
Robbery Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 363 (1983).
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its result on the legal spectrum of liability.3 To reach that answer, the
fact finder must engage in an interpretive act, considering not only
what can be seen or heard, but the significance of that testimony or
physical evidence in the context of both the world in which they oc-
curred and the fact finder's own world.
The significance of a handshake, or a moan, or shouted words to
criminal law depends both on the context in which each occurred and
the fact finder's own perception of the events and their context.4 The
outstretched hands of two men in an alley become a drug deal in the
context of testimony by police officers that drug paraphernalia lit-
tered the alleyway and that both men ran when the police shone
lights on them. The outstretched hands of the two men become a
drug deal as jurors consider their own perception of the area in ques-
tion and the defendant himself. Would they ever enter that alley in
that part of town if they weren't buying drugs? Would they ever sit
hunched and sallow at counsel table looking nervously around the
courtroom, as the defendant did, if they weren't addicted to drugs? As
the fact finder deliberates on the guilt of a defendant, he inevitably
recalls not only the evidence presented at trial, but how that evidence
conforms to his own observations, life experiences, and expectations.
To cabin this process as a mere credibility analysis is to belie the
full scope of its significance. In this process, the fact finder does more
than merely assess whether or not the evidence is true or believable;
he engages in an act of interpretation by which he assigns a legal
meaning to evidence in light of his own worldview.'
This act of interpretation is fraught with the risk of error or bias.'
Procedurally, criminal law seeks to control and to reduce such risks.
3. Distinct from motive, the "why" question asks what the actor intended and so
assigns legal significance to the act and result. See Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the
Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539, 545 (2015) (noting that the mental state
behind an action serves as a means of distinguishing the criminal from the purely acci-
dental and calibrates degrees of culpability); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the
Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1547-48 (1997) (contending that mens rea distinguishes degrees of legal
blameworthiness).
4. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 2-3 (2005) (discussing evidence law's
efforts to ensure decisional accuracy by controlling the flow of information to the fact finder).
5. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1984 (2017) (noting
that credibility assessments aside, a significant value of evidence lies in the fact finder's
ability to assess it based on "their own powers of observation and reasoning").
6. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 22-23 (1983) (discussing potential
sources of juror bias and error in interpretation); Ronald J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the
Theory of the Right to Trial by Jury, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 33, 37 (1988) ("[J]urors' experiences
and perspectives are crucial variables in determining the effect of the words that a witness
speaks at trial . . . .").
7. One of the most significant efforts to prevent error and bias is to promote a repre-
sentative cross section in juror selection. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)
2017] 3
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Before the trial even begins, jurors submit to the tedium of juror
questionnaires and the rigor of voir dire in an effort to ascertain po-
tential bias and to instill a sense of duty and seriousness of purpose
in the juror. Prior to deliberation, jury instructions seek to channel
juror discretion by defining the boundaries and terms of interpreta-
tion.' Likewise, judicial discretion is bounded by precedent0 and
statutory definition. " Threat of impeachment, appellate review,
and-in the case of elected judges-voter mutiny also serve to con-
strain judicial discretion or caprice." In the trial itself, evidentiary
rules' twin guardians of relevancy and reliability set limits on admis-
sible evidence and insulate against prejudice.3
In reality, however, facts-or, more accurately, their faithful in-
terpretation-are as much a product of the evidence used to support
them as the inferences drawn from them. In this aspect, procedural
safeguards risk failure not because they lack rigor (though they
may), but because they overlook a critical component of the substan-
tive law they apply to-the fact finder's interpretation. This interpre-
tation is based not only on the law's construct but on the fact finder's
own view of that construct in the context of his sense of the world as
("[B]road representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of
a diffused impartiality. . . ." (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)); JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 18 (1977) ("[J]urors bring to the jury box preju-
dice and perspectives gained from their lifetimes of experience" but this variance can be
mitigated with a mix of jurors who "will be impartial in the sense that they will reflect the
range of the community's attitudes"). In the context of evidence, evidentiary and procedur-
al rules work together to limit the risks of interpretation by limiting admissible evidence
and promoting impeachment, corroboration, and timely production. See Roth, supra note 5,
at 1984-85; Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You'" Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783, 788 (1990) (noting in
the context of implied assertions that the accuracy of the interpretation of language or
evidence relies on the perceptive abilities of the listener).
8. See Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 843, 846-47 (2015) (describing the value of juror selection processes); see also Devel-
opments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1451-56 (1997).
9. See Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors' Racial Biases: The Effects of
Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1729 (2015) (arguing for a
variety of innovative reforms to jury instruction models, but noting that such instructions
offer a mechanism to guide interpretation).
10. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (holding that lower federal courts are
bound by Supreme Court precedent).
11. See Scott Fruehwald, Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpre-
tation: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 973, 973-80 (2000) (noting
that regardless of different theories of judicial interpretation, statutes by necessity limit
the scope and type of discretion available to judges).
12. Admittedly, these may be limited checks on judicial power, but even their rarely
utilized existence suggests some effort to curtail discretion.
13. See STEIN, supra note 4, at 104-05.
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it is or ought to be. We interpret the acts of others through our own
subjective lens, reflecting our life experiences onto those we judge.
In the context of juvenile defendants, this habit of ascribing our
own potential motive to others is deeply problematic. In the past two
decades, advances in neuroscience have revealed what many, includ-
ing the court system, long suspected: kids simply do not reason like
adults.4 Their thought processes are not merely immature versions
of their future adult selves;5 they are different in kind and reflect
evolving epistemological mechanisms that carry with them funda-
mentally different valuations of risk," consequence,7 and reward.
In everyday life, this difference matters and is reflected in a variety
of protective rules for juveniles. To varying degrees, juveniles cannot
14. The following periodicals summarize such studies. See Richard J. Bonnie & Eliza-
beth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 159-60 (2013) [hereinafter Bonnie & Scott, The Teenage
Brain]; Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Develop-
ment Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 48-51 (2009); Carroll, supra note 3, at 574-76; Ter-
ry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
765, 766 (2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Brain Science After Graham]; Terry A. Maroney, The
False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89,
146-48 (2009) [hereinafter Maroney, False Promise]; Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Stein-
berg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 801 (2003) [hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Blam-
ing Youth]; Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Op-
tion, 95 JOWA L. REV. 1, 17-21 (2009).
15. See, e.g., B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22 CUR-
RENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 82, 82-83 (2013) (noting distinct differences between adoles-
cent and adult thought processes and further noting that such differences are the norm, as
opposed to a deviation). For a description of the law's treatment of this difference, see Eliza-
beth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 558-62 (2000).
16. See, e.g., William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 78-79 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993) (positing
that a lack of life experience may account for a willingness to take risks in adolescents)
[hereinafter Gardner, Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory]; William Gardner & Janna Her-
man, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS IN
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 25-26 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Gardner &
Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking] (noting that adolescents tend to be less risk
averse than adults and tend to weigh rewards more heavily than risks in making choices);
Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVEL-
OPMENTAL REV. 339, 348-54 (1992) [hereinafter Arnett, Reckless Behavior]; Elizabeth S.
Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 221, 223 (1995); Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 102, 102 (1993).
17. See, e.g., A.L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of
Things Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 105-11 (1986) (noting as indi-
viduals gain life experience they are better able to project events into the future).
18. See, e.g., Jeffrey Arnett, Sensation Seeking: A New Conceptualization and a New
Scale, 16 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 289, 292-94 (1994) [hereinafter Arnett,
Sensation Seeking] (discussing adolescent focus on novel sensation seeking in decisionmak-
ing processes).
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marry, drink, vote, join the army, get a tattoo, or engage in consen-
sual sexual activity. 9
In criminal law, this difference in thought processes creates a di-
lemma in determining a juvenile's mental state (or mens rea). In the
vast majority of cases, the accused's mental state defines the degree
of culpability and offers justification for punishment.2 0 Although most
mental state elements contain an objective component or are objec-
tive in nature, such a mental state requires a fact finder to consider
the accused's thought processes and perceptions in an effort to ascer-
tain his actual, as opposed to hypothetical, guilt.2 '
Despite the crucial role that mens rea plays in criminal law, the
mental state element is an elusive one. Unlike other elements of a
criminal offense, assessing mens rea requires the fact finder to make
an assessment of what a defendant was actually thinking, whether
through the defendant's own statements or through inferences drawn
from objective evidence. Unfortunately, however, when an adult fact
finder contemplates a juvenile defendant's mental state, he seeks to
interpret what a juvenile defendant was thinking through the lens of
his own adult thought processes.2 2 The significance of the juvenile's
actions or reactions is calibrated and checked against what they
would mean in the adult fact finder's life. How would the juror or
judge act or react in a like situation? As a result, this determination
is as much about what the fact finder perceives of the person being
judged as it is about what that person actually thought at the mo-
ment of the offense.
Other elements may offer the certainty and the comfort of objec-
tive fact. The victim was shot, or he was not. The defendant shot him,
or she did not. The victim's injury was caused by the shot, or it was
not. But to ask-"Did the defendant intend the shot?" "Did he know
with any certainty of the accuracy of his aim and the harm it would
19. See Carroll, supra note 3, at 569-74 (describing restrictions on juvenile activities).
20. In general, modern criminal law scholars tend to uniformly argue that criminal
offenses should carry a mental state element and strict liability offenses should be severely
limited. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 943, 954-59 (1999); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping
Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 425-28 (1993); Francis Bowes Sayre, Pub-
lic Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 n.5, 78-83 (1933).
21. See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine,
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123 n.73 (1996) (discussing the ALI's regularization of mental
states into categories based on subjective or objective classifications-all of which required
proof that the mental state alleged was in fact the defendant's mental state).
22. All jurisdictions in the United States require jurors to be at least eighteen years of
age and many jurisdictions link juror rolls to voter registration, property records and/or
driver's license records-all of which carry an age eligibility component. See VAN DYKE,
supra note 7, at 258-62. In practice, most jurors tend to be significantly older than eight-
een, though some states do set age limits on who can serve as a juror. Id.
6 [Vol. 45:1
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cause?" "Did he fire out of carelessness, or fear, or malice?"-is to
stumble down a path of interpretation in which the fact finder over-
lays each question with his own, fundamental inquiry: "What would
the defendant's actions or words signify in my own life? What would I
have been thinking?"
Thus, accuracy in assessing mens rea depends on the fact finder's
ability to approximate the defendant's own subjective thought pro-
cess. Yet, as advances in neuroscience increase our knowledge of ado-
lescent brain development, it has become increasingly apparent that
procedural protections urrounding both selection of fact finders and
admission of evidence fail to account for the risk that fact finders lack
the proper context through which to assess the adolescent actor's
mental state. The stark reality is that the juvenile justice system re-
lies on a false inferential rubric and, in the process, invites an imper-
fect application of the substantive law. As adult fact finders (whether
judge or jury) contemplate a juvenile offender's guilt, they inevitably
contemplate the juvenile's state of mind. In doing this, the adult fact
finder utilizes a distinct perspective that the defendant himself likely
does not share-that of an adult. Put another way, there is a concep-
tual gap in the current application of substantive criminal law to ju-
venile offenders. Juveniles are tried and convicted based on what an
adult believes their state of mind would have been, as opposed to the
juvenile's actual adolescent-centered state of mind.
This Article seeks to address this conceptual gap by arguing that
the fundamental value of neuroscience in the juvenile justice system
is not as a litmus test of guilt or responsibility, but rather as a means
to properly calibrate and contextualize the fact finder's calculation of
the offender's mental state. To be clear, I am not arguing for the cre-
ation of a new "juvenile centered" substantive law, but rather to hold
the current law to its purported aim: to assess each defendant's actu-
al state of mind based on the evidence presented. In the context of
juveniles, this requires re-centering the fact finder's consideration of
mens rea through an interpretive rubric that considers what is
known of the juvenile brain and thought processes.
Such an approach will produce a more accurate understanding of
the significance of the adolescent defendant's thoughts and words,
and will more precisely assess the juvenile's culpability. It will allow
the law to maintain a "cognitive integrity"-preserving the conceptu-
al core of substantive criminal law as it seeks to assign culpability
based on state-of-mind analysis-while recognizing the fundamental
differences between youth and adulthood. The need to address this
problem is especially urgent in light of the ongoing trends of an in-
2017] 7
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creasingly punitive juvenile justice system,2 3 and an increasingly rig-
orous application of transfer laws that move juvenile offenders to the
adult court system .24 Despite a better understanding that adolescents
are, in fact, different from adult actors, juvenile suspects are fre-
quently treated as adults and punished as such.25
Although a handful of judicial opinions and scholars have suggest-
ed a limited role for neuroscience in the context of Fifth"2 and Eighth
Amendments27 jurisprudence as applied to juveniles, both judges and
academics have largely failed to explore the significance of adolescent
brain science to the mental state question with sufficient depth.28
23. Despite President Obama's recent ban on juvenile solitary confinement in the
federal system, juveniles in state facilities are still subjected to such confinement. Juliet
Eilperin, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prison, WASH. POST,
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-bans-solitary-confinement-for-
juveniles-in-federal-prisons/2016/01/25/056el4b2-c3a2-1le5-9693-933a4d3lbcc8 story.html?
utm term=.2c884dc84f63 [https://perma.ccVW78-8UNN]. In addition, given that Obama's
ban was the product of an Executive Order, it is possible that even this advancement may
be undone by the new administration. For a description of trends in the increasingly puni-
tive treatment of juvenile offenders, see generally Ira M. Schwartz, Juvenile Crime-
Fighting Policies: What the Public Really Wants, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY:
TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 214, 214-16 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992); Catherine L. Car-
penter, Throwaway Children: The Tragic Consequences of a False Narrative, 45 Sw. L. REV.
461, 462-63 (2016); see also Andrew J. Harris et al., Collateral Consequences of Juvenile
Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Results From a Survey of Treatment Providers,
28 SEXUAL ABUSE 770, 771 (2015) (describing this punitive trend in the context of juvenile
sex offenders).
24. See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1793-94 (2016)
(noting the increase of direct file or direct transfer statutes that resulted in greater num-
bers of juvenile offenders being tried and sentenced as adults); David 0. Brink, Immaturi-
ty, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major
Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1574 (2004) (arguing that trends towards greater transfer is
not diminishing crime rates among juvenile offenders).
25. See Jodi Kent Lavy, Supreme Court's Will on Juvenile Offenders Thwarted, U.S.A.
TODAY (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnists/2017/02/02/
supreme-courts-juvenile-offenders-thwarted/97432956/ (noting that despite the Supreme
Court's ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana requiring hearings for children sentenced to life
without parole, states are either balking at providing hearings (Montgomery, who is now
seventy years old, still has not received a hearing) or judges are denying access to experts
and are using hearings to reinstate the life without parole sentence).
26. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-77 (2011) (requiring courts to take
juvenile brain development into account when assessing the reasonableness of a custody
perception for Miranda purposes).
27. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476-80 (2012) (using neuroscience to hold
mandatory life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses unconstitutional as ap-
plied to juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67-71 (2010) (using neurosci-
ence to hold life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses unconstitutional as
applied to juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567-71 (2005) (using neuro-
science to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders).
28. This is not to say scholars have not written about neuroscience and the juvenile
justice system, but it is to say that most have dismissed the notion that adolescent brain
development provides useful insights to mental state questions. This dismissal is premised
JUVENILE DEFENDANTS
This Article makes three arguments in support of implementing neu-
roscience to guide the assessment of mental states and, ultimately,
the guilt of juvenile actors.
First, this Article argues that there is value in the recognition that
juvenile offenders are distinct from their adult counterparts. Just as
the juvenile system recognized this difference at its genesis, emerg-
ing science now confirms the reality of this difference. Although the
justice system has constructed procedural safeguards around this
notion of difference-both with the creation of a separate juvenile
justice system and, increasingly, in the application of the Eighth
Amendment in adult court systems and the Fifth Amendment across
both systems-these procedural protections fail to remedy the sub-
stantive disconnect created when adult fact finders apply criminal
law to juvenile actors.
Second, this Article contends that adult fact finders lack the con-
text and perspective to assess mental state elements in juvenile of-
fenders accurately. To be sure, criminal law seeks to measure the
"actual" (as opposed to imagined) mental state of a defendant, but in
undertaking this task, it relies on inherently flawed interpretive ves-
sels. Even though adult fact finders were once adolescents and, as
such, enjoyed adolescent thought processes, time and aging have
erased or mitigated this perspective. Put another way, almost any
adult can recount, likely with a degree of nostalgia, all the "stupid"
things he or she did as a teenager, but few, if any, are capable of re-
counting why those "stupid" things seemed like a good idea when the
adult was a teen. For an adult to understand this would require turn-
ing back time and neurological development, to return to a way of
thinking that the adult brain has abandoned. It is to reassess and
reprioritize basic cognitive influences such as risk, reward, and the
value of peer approval.2" In this, the criminal law asks the adult fact
finder to undertake an impossible task.
Third and finally, this Article offers a new vision of how the sys-
tem should assess juvenile mens rea-a vision that allows such
judgments to be informed by what neuroscience knows of adolescent
thought processes. For several reasons, I do not advocate a broad rule
preclusion of juvenile culpability nor do I argue that juveniles are
incapable of forming mental states as articulated in criminal law.
on the inability of neuroscience to either predict future or recall past mental states. See
Maroney, False Promise, supra note 14, at 148.
In contrast, this Article makes the more nuanced argument that neuroscience provides
evidence of adolescent thought processes that serve to contextualize and inform the fact
finder's analysis of evidence of the juvenile offender's mental state.
29. See supra notes 15-18.
2017] 9
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The data supports neither global conclusion. Instead, this Article rec-
ognizes that there are limits to the value of neuroscientific evidence
and proposes a series of limitations to permit admission of neurosci-
ence to facilitate its proper use in the calculation of the state of mind
element.
First, evidentiary rules of relevancy should permit the introduc-
tion of neuroscience evidence akin to testimony that establishes con-
text. Just as a police officer is permitted to testify, often without ex-
pert qualification, that based on years of experience she recognized
that the proffered hand in the alley was a drug deal, so should a neu-
roscientist be permitted to testify that an adolescent's decision to
shout that he would "fuck up" the school principal is evidence of his
immature thought process as opposed to his genuine intent to assault
a school administrator. Such testimony contextualizes factual evi-
dence for the jury and offers a perspective that the fact finder may
otherwise lack.
Second, jury instructions should be tailored to incorporate what is
known about adolescent brain development to provide a rubric as-
sessing the state of mind element. Similar to proposed instructions
on implicit or cultural bias, or defenses such as battered women's,
PTSD, or self-defense, such instructions would recognize that fact
finders may be ill-equipped or unable to fully understand the signifi-
cance of the defendant's thought process without guidance. In the
context of adolescent hought processes, such instructions would rec-
ognize that although the fact finder might have once been an adoles-
cent and engaged in adolescent thought processes, that does not
mean the fact finder is capable now, as an adult, of properly inter-
preting the legal significance of facts as they apply to the juvenile
actor's mental state. The model jury instruction would provide the
context through which the fact finder can interpret the evidence of
the defendant's state of mind.30
My argument for these proposed changes in the treatment of neu-
roscience evidence proceeds in three parts. Parts II and III lay the
groundwork. Part II considers the genesis of the juvenile court and
its development over the last century, including the emphasis on the
30. Based on instructions used in the context of other defenses that hinge on the de-
fendant's perspective, a model jury instruction might suggest that the fact finder "could
infer the defendant's state of mind from her actions, however, such an inference should be
made in light of the established fact that an adolescent such as the defendant may lack the
ability to properly calculate or appreciate risk in the same way an adult might. This failure
to properly calculate risk may render the defendant unable to understand the significance
of her actions or words. As a result, a defendant's actions which if taken by an adult might
suggest one mental state, might suggest a wholly different, lesser mental state in the con-
text of an adolescent."
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emergence and use of neuroscience in the context of Fifth and Eighth
Amendments jurisprudence. Part III considers the evidentiary con-
struct of proof in criminal law-in particular, the entwined roles of
relevance and inference. Part IV considers the intersection of these
concepts of proof with the aims of the juvenile system and what neu-
roscience has revealed about adolescent brain development. It con-
cludes that criminal law's construction of relevancy and reliance on
inference to prove the mental state are fundamentally flawed in their
application to juvenile defendants. As adult fact finders seek to in-
terpret evidence in an effort to assess a juvenile defendant's mental
state, they seek to imagine a perspective they no longer enjoy. In this
exercise of imagination, the purported goal of substantive criminal law
to assign culpability based on a defendant's actual state of mind is lost,
and we risk inaccurate and unjust outcomes for juvenile defendants.
II. THE STORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN
A. In the Beginning
The history of the American juvenile justice system is, in many
ways, the history of the nation's evolving vision of children them-
selves. Until the early nineteenth century, the American legal system
made no age distinction.3 1 Courts treated children who committed
crimes in the same way as adult offenders. Child suspects were
charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the same manner as their
adult counterparts.32 This treatment of children as "small" adults was
consistent with social norms of the time that drew few distinctions
between adult and child actors .33
This early justice system was not completely without acts of mer-
cy. Judges might, and at times did, dismiss charges against children.
Juries nullified their verdicts, acquitting what appeared to be factu-
31. See CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN & MARSHALL S. GORDON III, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 16-25 (1979); David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early
Twentieth Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE 42, 43 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002); Barry C. Feld, A Century of
Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution That Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189,
193-94 (2007).
32. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 213 (1980) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE];
ROBERT C. TROJANOWICZ & MERRY MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CONCEPTS AND CON-
TROL 12 (3d ed. 1983); JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLE-
GAL COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 3-4 (1998).
33. See WATKINS, supra note 32, at 214 (describing social attitudes towards childhood).
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ally guilty children.34 But these acts of mercy were the product of ex-
tra-legal sympathies and social attitudes.
The common law defense of infancy did provide a legal doctrine to
shelter accused children, but the doctrinal cover of the defense was
limited.35 Infancy sought to differentiate actors who lacked criminal
responsibility and, as such, were not culpable for their acts.36 Only
children who were so young that they could not differentiate right
from wrong were immune under the doctrine.37 Common law pre-
sumed that children under the age of seven lacked criminal capacity
and those over fourteen were fully responsible or as responsible as
adults.3 8 Those in between the ages of seven and fourteen enjoyed a
rebuttable presumption that they lacked criminal capacity.39 Outside
of the limited defense of infancy, substantive criminal law offered little
shelter for youth, and procedural protections for youth did not exist.
1. The Progressives and the Kids
As social constructs of childhood began to evolve, most notably in
the early nineteenth century with the recognition of adolescence as a
distinct developmental stage, support for the criminal law's treat-
ment of children as no different than adults began to wane.4 0 As early
social reformers began to create special institutions for children, they
pushed back on the court system that would seek to hold children
criminally liable as if they were adults.4 1
34. See JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1640-1981, at 51 (1988) (describing informal acts of mercy shown towards
juvenile defendants).
35. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 503, 511-12 (1984) (describing the historical requirements of the infancy defense).
36. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6(a) (2d ed. 2003).
37. Id.
38. See Walkover, supra note 35, at 510-11.
39. See LAFAVE, supra note 36.
40. See SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 27-39 (1996) (describing how social changes, including
changing views of children, fueled reform in the juvenile justice system); WATKINS, supra
note 32, at 46 (describing the early Progressive argument for a "disassociate" juvenile law
to reflect the reality that children were different than adults).
41. Early reformers created Houses of Refuge that served as age-segregated institu-
tions and in turn created opportunities for charity organizations to intervene on behalf of
youth and to provide a social safety network for children. See THOMAS J. BERNARD & ME-
GAN C. KURLYCHEK, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 48-52 (2d ed. 2010); JOSEPH HAWES,
CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
169-73 (1971); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 206-14 (1971) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, THE ASYLUM];
ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 219-21; SUTTON, supra note 34, at 70-74.
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It was not long before the first juvenile court appeared in Chicago
and its model spread throughout the country.4 2 Founded on Progres-
sive ideals, the early juvenile court focused on the interlocking prem-
ises that childhood was a distinct period and that children required
social control in ways that adults might not.4 3 As such, the prototype
juvenile court systems sought to foster opaque and normative values
such as morality and good citizenship.4 4 They eschewed the adult
criminal court's allegiance to formalized procedure and punitive sen-
tencing schemes, instead adopting informal methods and dispositions
that promoted the child's best interests and rehabilitation.4 5
While the history of the juvenile court system is well-documented,
it is worth a brief discussion of the historical factors that drove its
creation.4 6 By the end of the nineteenth century, America itself had
begun to change significantly. Modernization and industrialization
fueled significant demographic changes.4 7 Large populations began to
migrate from rural communities to urban centers with their promise
of industrial work. 4 8 At the same time, burgeoning immigrant popu-
lations, fleeing oppression and poverty in Europe and Asia, flooded to
the same industrial centers.49 These influxes not only altered the
American landscape but also posed distinct social problems.5 0 Grow-
ing populations in urban centers translated to a growing class of ur-
42. See HAWES, supra note 41, at 170 (citing Juvenile Court Act, § 3, 1899 Ill. Laws
131, 132 (regulating the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent
children)); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (describ-
ing the establishment of the first independent juvenile justice system in the United States
in Chicago in 1899); Simon I. Singer, Criminal and Teen Courts as Loosely Coupled Sys-
tems of Juvenile Justice, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 511-518 (1998) (summarizing schol-
arly discussion of the juvenile court system).
43. See ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 43-81; Mack, supra note 42, at 107.
44. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV.
691, 693-95 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation] (noting that the Progressives be-
lieved that benign state intervention would prevent and reduce delinquency); Mack, supra
note 42, at 107.
45. See Feld, Transformation, supra note 44, at 693 (noting the informality of the
emerging juvenile system).
46. See, e.g., HAWES, supra note 41, at 170; ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at
206-07; SUTTON, supra note 34, at 68-77; WATKINS, supra note 32, at 46; Barry C. Feld,
The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legisla-
tive Changes]; Singer, supra note 42.
47. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914, at 7-14 (2d ed.
1995); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN To F.D.R. 3-12 (1955);
MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 233-36 (2003); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 67-68 (1984) (discussing the effect of modernization on law).
48. See HAYS, supra note 47, at 8.
49. See WATKINS, supra note 32, at 31.
50. See Feld, Transformation, supra note 44, at 693.
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ban poor-particularly, poor urban youth, replete with crowded hous-
ing environments, poor labor conditions, and often informal or absent
social support systems.5 '
Changes in family structure and functions accompanied migration
and economic changes.5 2 Women's roles became more domestic-with
women described as the primary familial role model, even as many
women bore extra-familial work responsibilities.5 3 Childhood and ad-
olescence were recognized as distinct and critical periods of develop-
ment.5 4 Children were no longer viewed as smaller versions of adults
but were viewed as vulnerable, passive, and innocent.55 Children
were not born inherently "ready for life"-they needed adults to pre-
pare them and nurture them.5 6 As notions of children shifted, so did
notions of parental responsibility, as the new-found preparatory re-
sponsibility for children fell in greater force upon the parent.5 7
Viewed through the lens of Progressivism, this new vision of
childhood and parenting encompassed an obligation to ensure moral
and social development. 58 Progressives viewed the state, with its
power to create social agencies, as bearing a responsibility for the
burgeoning urban populations.5 9 Progressives imagined the state as a
benevolent and unifying force that could address social ills through
the creation of public agencies that would introduce and reinforce
middle-class social values while promoting assimilation.o Immigrant
populations would be "Americanized," and the poor would be rendered
virtuous.6' An overview of Progressive reform programs demonstrates
a strong allegiance to child-centered change.6 2 Progressives champi-
51. See MCGERR, supra note 47, at 14, 99-102, 118.
52. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO PRESENT 73-74 (1980).
53. Id.; SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING IDE-
ALS AND PRACTICES, 1870 TO THE PRESENT 22-23 (1978).
54. See JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE
PRESENT 142-43 (1977); see also ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 43-81; Mack,
supra note 42, at 107.
55. Feld, Transformation, supra note 44, at 694.
56. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 43-76 (describing Progressives' creation
of public institutions such as compulsory public schools, hospitals, and child refuge organi-
zations designed to help foster the child's moral development); Feld, Transformation, supra
note 44, at 693-94 (stating that during this period, the idea emerged that children should
be treated differently than adults due to their lack of life experience and maturity).
57. See KETT, supra note 54, at 168-70.
58. See DEGLER, supra note 52, at 97-100; SUTTON, supra note 34, at 61.
59. Singer, supra note 42, at 511-12.
60. See Feld, Transformation, supra note 44, at 693 ("Progressives believed that be-
nevolent state action guided by experts could alleviate social ills . . . .").
61. WATKINS, supra note 32, at 32; ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 51.
62. See Singer, supra note 42, at 511-12.
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oned anti-child labor movements, welfare laws, compulsory school
attendance laws, and the creation of a distinct juvenile court system.63
The Progressive concept of social ills did more than just create ju-
venile-centered reform, however. It also drove the resulting juvenile
justice system's sense of the source of juvenile delinquency itself.
While criminal law historically attributed the cause of crime to the
free will of actors, the emerging study of criminology cast crime in
more positivist terms.64 Progressives were quick to adopt this ideolog-
ical perspective. As such, crime was determined rather than chosen.
Efforts to remedy crime, therefore, required the identification of the
causes of criminal behavior.65 In the process, the previously dominant
question of the actor's moral responsibility receded, and the inquiry
was refocused on reforming the offender and the circumstances that
created him. 6 6 Progressives drew a causal line between moral decay
and criminal behavior.6 7
Accordingly, they fashioned a juvenile justice system meant to ad-
dress moral failing and, as a side benefit, delinquency. This system's
goal was rehabilitation of the offender.68 Possible remedies for find-
ings of delinquency ranged from mentorship to removal from the fam-
ily6 9 to removal from the jurisdiction on an orphan train.70 This model
63. See id.; ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 51-53.
64. See DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5 (1964); ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE,
supra note 32, at 50-51 (describing positivism theories as identifying the antecedent varia-
bles that produced crime and deviance in contrast to classic formulations which attributed
crime to free will).
65. See TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 32, at 40-42 (describing the rise of posi-
tivist theories of criminology).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 41-42.
68. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1093, 1097-1100 (1991)
(noting that the juvenile court purports to act in the child's best interests as opposed to
recognizing that the state often has goals that are inconsistent with and undermine the
child's autonomy).
69. See HAWES, supra note 41, at 169.
70. This misnamed phenomenon was popular in major metropolitan centers including
New York, Boston, and Chicago, and actually predated the Progressive Movement. See
generally Rebecca S. Trammell, Orphan Train Myths and Legal Reality, 5 MOD. AM. 3, 3-6
(2009). These orphan or mercy trains, removed "misplaced," "at risk," foundling, and or-
phaned children from urban centers and placed them in foster houses primarily in the
Midwest. See STEPHEN O'CONNOR, ORPHAN TRAINS: THE STORY OF CHARLES LORING BRACE
AND THE CHILDREN HE SAVED AND FAILED, 106-07 (2001). In the 1850s, faced with a grow-
ing problem of vagrant and often gang-affiliated children, police in New York began arrest-
ing children, and holding them and trying them as adults. Social organizations intervened
offering first Houses of Refuge and eventually what became known as "orphan trains." Id.
at 106; NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CHANGE
FOSTER CARE 198 (2001). These trains sought to remove children from urban centers and
return them to rural communities where they could be raised with "Christian values."
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rejected the adversarial system. In the juvenile justice system the
Progressives envisioned, judges, probation officers, police, and prose-
cutors were all representatives of a benevolent state intent on "rescu-
ing" the wayward child.7 This conceptualization of the system justi-
fied addressing juvenile delinquency prior to any criminal act actual-
ly occurring." In addition, juveniles in this system required neither
procedural protections nor counsel, as all actors in the system-from
the prosecutor to the probation officer to the judge-acted in the
child's best interest substituting as parent and moral compass.73
This model was not without difficulties. One Progressive's human-
itarian, "child saving" model is another's expansion of social control
over poor, minority, and/or immigrant populations.7 4 It is beyond the
scope of this Article to delve deeply into the devastating effect such
"well intended" systems had on families and juveniles. However, it
While the trains themselves were organized by charitable welfare organizations, the early
juvenile court system often used the trains as a "rehabilitative" alternative. Though the
trains were supervised, once a child was placed in a foster home, there was little supervi-
sion to ensure that the child was treated well. Tim Hacsi, From Indenture to Family Foster
Care: A Brief History of Child Placing, 74 CHILD WELFARE 155, 168-69 (1995) (noting that
orphan train programs were often poorly organized and there was little monitoring of
placements). Foster parents were screened only for their self-proclaimed need for a child
and for their "moral standing." Id. As a result, the record of placement from orphan trains
was mixed. Kurt Mundorff, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to
Reform Child Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 131, 176-77 (2003). Some
charities that ran orphan trains monitored placements and removed children from abusive
or inappropriate homes. See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering, and
the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of Adoption Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 263
(2002). Andrew Burke and John Brady, both orphan train riders, grew up to become gover-
nors of North Dakota and Alaska, respectively. For other children, the placements were not
nearly as successful. See LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECT,
AND ABUSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 139-40 (1997). Children suffered physical and sexual
abuse in foster homes. Some farmers saw the children as nothing more than a cheap source
of labor. Joan Gittens, Friendless Foundlings and Homeless Half-Orphans, 24 CHI. HIST.
40, 69 (1995) (noting that a common criticism of orphan trains was that they promoted
indentured servitude of children). The runaway rate, particularly among boys, was high as
was the rejection rate by foster families. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 14,
17 (1994); Mundorff, supra, at 176-77.
71. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (noting that juvenile offenders were made to
feel that the juvenile justice system was "saving" them from immorality and a criminal
career, and that the state was acting in their best interests); Feld, Legislative Changes,
supra note 46, at 476-77; W.J. Keegan, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8
PAC. L.J. 811, 811 (1977).
72. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 46, at 477 (noting that under the Pro-
gressive model, juvenile proceedings "were initiated by a petition in the welfare of the
child, rather than by a criminal complaint").
73. See id. at 476-77; Keegan, supra note 71, at 811 (stating that the state assumed
the role of the surrogate parent).
74. For an excellent discussion of competing views of the juvenile justice system and
the results of its reform efforts, see ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVEN-
TION OF DELINQUENCY, at xxiv, 36, 46, 98-100 (2d ed. 1977).
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would be remiss in this brief history of the juvenile court system not
to acknowledge the disparate impact that orphan trains, juvenile
homes, and even Houses of Refuge had on the poor and children of
color.7 1 It would also be remiss not to acknowledge the gendered com-
ponent of the Progressive reform movement, which created and en-
dorsed an early juvenile justice system that punished girls for sexual
promiscuity and boys for unruliness under a blanket charge of incor-
rigibility, on the premise that such behavior was a harbinger not only
of immorality but of corruption and criminality to come.
At its core, the Progressive movement viewed adolescent autono-
my as a source of criminality. Children needed guidance, and the
Progressives structured a juvenile court system around this proposi-
tion. The juvenile court claimed jurisdiction over incorrigible, unruly,
and promiscuous children.7 1 It reinforced parental control, and when
parental influence was deemed inadequate or nonexistent, it allowed
the state to intervene. 7 Through the legal doctrine of parens patriae,
the state assumed the role of parent to justify ever-widening circles of
control and intervention and ever-decreasing circles of formality and
procedure.7 ' The juvenile court had to be able to diagnose the causes
of delinquency and to ascertain the cure.7 ' To constrain the court
with procedural requirements-such as counsel, juries, or doctrines
against self-incrimination-would only hinder its underlying mission
to rehabilitate rather than punish.80
2. The Constitution and the Kids
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault up-
ended the Progressive's benign vision of the juvenile justice system.
In granting limited constitutional procedural rights to youth in de-
linquency hearings, the Court noted that the rosy presentation of the
juvenile system shrouded a much darker reality in which children
were punished without process and often for behavior or characteris-
tics that were not criminalized.8'
Gerald Gault was fifteen years old on June 8, 1964, when he was
taken from his home by a county sheriffs deputy after a neighbor
75. Id.; BERNARD & KURLEYCHEK, supra note 41, at 91; ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra
note 32, at 51; Trammell, supra note 70, at 3-4.
76. See BERNARD & KURLEYCHEK, supra note 41, at 91.
77. See id. at 87-89.
78. See Mack, supra note 42, at 109 (describing budding Progressive ideals and pro-
moting the doctrine of parens patriae, arguing that the state be permitted to act as parent
when parental supervision was inadequate or absent); Keegan, supra note 71, at 811.
79. See ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 32, at 50-52.
80. BERNARD & KURLEYCHEK, supra note 41, at 91.
81. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
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complained about having received an offensive call originating from
the Gault family trailer." Gault's parents were never notified that he
had been taken, and when his mother attempted to retrieve him from
the sheriffs department later that evening, she was turned away.8
The next day, Gault appeared without counsel at a preliminary hear-
ing where, after hearing the statement of probable cause, the presiding
judge told Gault he would think about whether or not to release him.8 4
A few days later, and without any explanation, Gault was re-
leased, and his family received a single notice that the judge had set
the matter for trial.8 5 At trial, again unrepresented, Gault was con-
victed and ordered to be confined at a State Industrial School for the
period of his minority, which was until twenty-one years old under
state law, or for a lesser period as deemed appropriate.8 6
Gault was convicted of having made a "lewd call" without either
supporting sworn testimony from witnesses or any meaningful oppor-
tunity to contest the charge.87 The victim never even appeared in
court, having been informed that it was unnecessary for her to do so
as she would not be giving testimony.8 8 The judge found that Gault
had confessed to the call, an issue his family, and Gault himself, dis-
puted.8" No transcript of the proceeding was made.90 If convicted as
an adult, Gault would have faced a maximum sentence of two months
imprisonment, or a fine between five dollars and fifty dollars.9'
Gault challenged his conviction, claiming that for all its rhetoric
about rehabilitation and protection of the child's best interest, the
juvenile justice system had deprived him of his liberty arbitrarily.92
In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged the historical mo-
tives behind the creation of the juvenile system.9 3 Describing the his-
torical treatment of juveniles, the Court observed that early reform-
ers rejected formalism and procedural protections in an effort to re-
cast juvenile court not as a criminal proceeding with punitive mo-
tives, but as a civil proceeding driven by rehabilitative aims and the
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 7-8.
87. Id. at 7.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 7-10.
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. Id. at 8-9.
92. Id. at 9-10.
93. Id. at 14-18.
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child's best interests.9 4 The Court noted that despite the benevolent
motivations that led to the system's genesis, the day-to-day practice
of the juvenile system presented a different story.95 Juveniles suf-
fered from the "unbridled discretion" of a system that sought to grant
the state the power of the parent.96 This discretion, the Court rea-
soned, even if motivated by the best of intentions, "is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure."9 7
The Court further noted that "[t]he absence of substantive stand-
ards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compas-
sionate, individualized treatment"98 and "[t]he absence of procedural
rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced
fair, efficient, and effective procedures."99 Instead, children like Gault
were as likely to suffer from arbitrariness as they were to experience
"justice" in the juvenile court system.'00 The Court famously conclud-
ed, "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court."'0' Accordingly, the Court found that the
Due Process Clause applied to juveniles charged in juvenile court. 02
Procedural protections, the Court reasoned, were necessary to avoid
unfairness, "inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact," and arbitrary
dispositions.10 3 For his trouble, Gault won the right to counsel, the
right to formal notice of charges against him, the right to formal no-
tice of his right against self-incrimination, and the right to confront
witnesses.104
This grant of procedural rights in juvenile court was limited. Four
years later in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court reconsidered the
appropriate levels of procedural protections in the juvenile justice
system.05 The McKeiver Court concluded that the procedural protec-
tions the Court had contemplated in Gault did not extend so far as to
create a constitutional requirement of juries in juvenile courts.06 The
Court in McKeiver expressed frustration that Gault was both too
94. Id. at 15-18.
95. Id. at 17-19.
96. Id. at 17-18.
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 27-28.
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id. at 57.
103. Id. at 19-20.
104. See id. at 41-57.
105. 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).
106. Id. at 545.
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broad and too narrow.o' It was overly broad in the sense that the
opinion lambasted the informality of the juvenile system.'o But it
was also too narrow in the sense that the Gault Court had limited its
procedural requirements to four rights, declining to reach the ques-
tion of other procedural rights.09
This left state courts uncertain of the precise procedural require-
ments of the juvenile court system post-Gault."o McKeiver was not
the first opinion to attempt to draw procedural boundaries for the
juvenile justice system. Prior to McKeiver, the Court's decisions in Ha-
ley, Gallegos, Kent, DeBacker, and In re Winship all attempted to de-
fine the precise procedural protections required in the juvenile court
system."' In the process, the Court confronted a post-Gault paradox.
On the one hand, the Court in Gault had rejected the juvenile
court system's informality and lack of procedural protections."2 But
on the other hand, in Gault and the cases that followed, the Court
attempted to maintain the core value of the juvenile court system-to
protect the child.113 Central to the maintenance of this goal was the
acknowledgment that children were fundamentally different than
adults, simultaneously more vulnerable and more redeemable. A dis-
tinct juvenile justice system served this difference-focusing on the
child's particular needs and not just his guilt.114 As a result, the juve-
nile system was not constitutionally compelled to follow the same
procedural requirements as the adult court system, particularly
when such requirements jeopardized the restorative power of the ju-
venile court."5 So when the presence of a jury threatened to under-
mine the goals and objectives of the juvenile justice system by being
less sensitive to the unique condition of youth, the Court found it was
not constitutionally required."6 The Court reasoned that a juvenile
107. Id. at 538-39.
108. Id. at 538-39, 541.
109. Id. at 538.
110. Id. at 541-42.
111. Id. at 531-33 (describing each case).
112. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967).
113. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547-50.
114. The McKeiver Court noted that while "'faith in the quality of the juvenile bench is
not an entirely satisfactory substitute for due process,' the judges in the juvenile court 'do
take a different view of their role than that taken by their counterparts in the criminal
courts.' " Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 547-51.
116. Id. at 550.
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court judge as fact finder might offer more promise of mercy and re-
demption for the child defendant."7
Thus, the McKeiver Court held that juvenile court systems must
balance the need for procedural protections with the underlying goal
to protect and promote the child's best interests." Striking this bal-
ance, however, has long been a contested proposition and at various
points, the fulcrum of this balance has shifted. As juvenile crime
rates rose in the 1980s and 1990s, a new narrative emerged."9 Politi-
cians began to speak not of the need to protect children within the
juvenile court system, but of the need to protect society from a grow-
ing class of "super predators."o2 0 "Super predator" was a term used to
describe children whose raw criminality not only rendered them in-
corrigible and unruly, to borrow the Progressive's diagnosis, but bent
on committing increasingly violent or predatory crime. 121
117. Id. at 534 (holding that a judge who was accustomed to juvenile cases was more
likely than a jury to be sensitive and schooled to the realities of the juvenile justice system).
118. See id. at 550-51.
119. "Between 1984 and 1994, the number of murders involving only juvenile offenders
increased by 150% .... " Howard N. Snyder, Law Enforcement and Juvenile Crime, JUV.
OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT'L REP. SERIES BULL. 1, 5 (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/191031.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8UL-FFRT]; see also Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and
Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash", 87 MINN. L. REV.
1447, 1454 n.18, 1515-18, 1527-28 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Justice] (arguing that
the increase in black youth homicide rates in the late 1980s produced "get tough" crime
policies). It is worth noting that during this period there was a surge in crime rates gener-
ally nationwide. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL OR-
DER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 90 (2001).
120. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 400-05
(2006) (arguing that the news media's coverage of crime resulted in punitive criminal and
juvenile justice policies); Feld, Juvenile Justice, supra note 119, at 1517-18, 1527-
28 (arguing that increasing rates of violent juvenile offenses, particularly black youth hom-
icide rates, in the late 1980s "provided the immediate political impetus to 'get tough' and to
'crack down' on youth crime" and that the "[n]ews media coverage ... overemphasiz[ed] the
role of minority perpetrators in the commission of violent crime," so that "distorted news
coverage . . . allows [politicians] to enact racial animus in the guise of crime policies.");
William R. Montross, Jr. & Patrick Mulvaney, Virtue and Vice: Who Will Report on the
Failings of the American Criminal Justice System?, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1429-36
(2009) (arguing that American crime reporting is "succinct, superficial, and devoid of con-
text" and that criminal justice reporting is practically nonexistent); see also Jerry
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1551-57 (2005).
121. The term "super predator" was coined by the conservative criminologist John
Dilulio. See WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT:
MORAL POVERTY.. .AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996).
Interestingly enough, Dilulio did not recommend either increasing adult prosecution of
juveniles or prolonged incarceration for "super predators." Rather he recommended faith-
based rehabilitation for juveniles. Id. at 205-08. For a discussion of the term, and phenom-
enon of "super predators," see Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on
the Demand for Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 729, 732-58 (2011); Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice Caught Between The Exorcist and
A Clockwork Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 715, 720-21 (2002). Dilulio later regretted the
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In response to the threat of super predators, states scrambled not
only to increase the rate of transfer from juvenile court to adult court,
often at increasingly younger ages, but to increase sentencing regu-
larity in juvenile court. 2 2 Children were not only more likely to be
tried as adults as a result of fear over super predators, but if they
were retained in the juvenile court system, they faced a sentencing
regime that resembled the adult system more closely.123 Like their
adult analog, juvenile dispositions were divided into presumptive
sentencing ranges with decreased judicial discretion.
While the predicted class of super predators failed to materialize,
the reforms they prompted lingered. The rate of transfer of juveniles
to the adult court system remains high, as does the rate of automatic
state transfer regimes or statutes that permit transfer of the child
with no hearing or procedural protection. 124 Likewise, sentencing
schemes in the juvenile court system continue to bear a strong re-
semblance to the adult court system, with presumptive ranges calcu-
lated based on a combination of prior criminal history and the level of
the offense. 125 Beyond this, states show increasing willingness to al-
low juvenile adjudications of guilt to "score" in calculation of the
adult criminal history for future adult sentences. 126
In the last two decades, the post-Gault conundrum has both re-
trod old ground and taken on a new dimension. Advances in neuro-
science have reaffirmed the premise of early Progressives and the
post-Gault Court alike-children are, in fact, fundamentally different
than adults. In this sense, the Supreme Court's most recent line of
cases exploring the constitutionality of the juvenile system, and the
scientific evidence upon which it is based, revisits the debate raised
by Gault: how to properly balance the needs and interests of the child
within the juvenile justice system.
creation of the term and rejected the sentencing reforms and statutory modifications that
resulted. See Margulies, supra, at 752. Dilulio actually joined an amicus brief in the Miller
case which argued that life without parole sentences were inappropriate for juveniles.
122. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 121, at 750-51; see also Steven Friedland, The
Rhetoric of Juvenile Rights, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 137, 138 (1995) (describing judicial
and prosecutorial response to the super predator threat).
123. See Margulies, supra note 121, at 751-52.
124. See, e.g., Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain
Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 38-41 (2013) (describing juvenile transfer stand-
ards). This trend towards auto-transfer may be lessening slightly. See, e.g., Ohio v. Aalim,
83 N.E.3d 862 (Ohio 2016) (overturning Ohio's statute which permitted the transfer of
juveniles to the adult court system without a hearing); H.B. 3718, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill.
2015) (signed into law in 2015 and raised the age at which a juvenile's case may be automati-
cally filed in adult court); 2015 Conn. Acts 15-183 (Reg. Sess.) (which reduced the types of
cases for which juveniles' may be automatically transferred to the adult court system).




But the Supreme Court's recent decisions and the insights of mod-
ern neuroscience raise a question not previously addressed by the
post-Gault decisions: given the fundamental differences between
adults and children, should substantive criminal law be applied to
children in precisely the same way as adults? Or do differences be-
tween juveniles and adults require a recalibration of substantive
law?
3. Science, the Constitution, and the Kids
In some ways, the Supreme Court's recent case law shares an af-
finity with the Progressive's early vision of the juvenile justice sys-
tem, albeit a modernized version of that vision. Children are recog-
nized as different and, as such, their perceptions of custody and the
calculation of their culpability must be recalibrated. In a series of
cases starting with Roper v. Simmons,2 7 the modern Court has done
what previous Courts failed to do: it created an Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence informed by the age of the offender. In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 2 8 the Court extended its logic, with regard to youth, to the
custodial analysis required by Miranda. While these cases struck
new ground in the context of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the
basis for the ruling drew heavily on the Court's previous treatment of
the condition of youth. From tattooing to marriage to contracts to
prayer in schools to conscription to alcohol consumption, the Court
and the legislative branch have consistently drawn a protective line
around youth and in the process designated the condition of "youth"
as a critical factor to legal analysis.'" In each of these rulings, a ju-
risprudence of youth has developed that is premised on the funda-
mental notion that juveniles in general-and adolescents in particu-
lar-are a distinct class of actors, and that distinction carries a legal
significance.3 0 Scientific evidence confirms this premise.
a. Youth and the Eighth Amendment
Prior to the Court's decisions in the Roper line of cases and in
J.D.B., the Court had begun to develop an Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence based on the premise that juveniles categorically lacked the
mental sophistication of adults and that this immaturity could affect
127. 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
128. 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011).
129. See Carroll, supra note 3, at 569-74 (discussing regulations and decisions based on
the "jurisprudence of youth").
130. See id.
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culpability.' 3 ' While these early cases did not have the benefit of
modern neuroscientific studies and did not categorically overturn
punishments for juveniles over the age of sixteen, they laid the criti-
cal groundwork for the Court's more recent decisions linking notions
of culpability to the science of cognitive development.13 2
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons,13 3 the Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment categorically precluded the execution of juvenile
offenders.134 In doing this, the Court rejected the need for an individ-
ualized assessment of the juvenile offender.13 5 Relying on scientific
evidence, the Court found that the differences between juvenile and
adult offenders were "too marked" and "well understood" to require
individual analysis.136 Juveniles were simply "categorically less cul-
pable than" adult criminals.13 7 Their lack of fully formed identity,13 8
their lack of control,13 9 and their incomplete cognitive and behavioral
development4 0 all led the Court to conclude that the behavior of a
131. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1993) (holding that age should serve
as a mitigator at sentencing because "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young" and "[t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered ac-
tions and decisions" which, while rendering the child dangerous and his decisionmaking
poor, are also transient, and likely to subside as the child matures, counseling toward leni-
ency at sentencing); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-71, 380 (1989) (limiting
Thompson but holding that the minimum age for execution was sixteen as those younger
lacked a demonstration of culpability based on their immaturity and susceptibility to peer
influence); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23, 833, 835, 837 (1988) (holding
that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of defendants who were under the age of
sixteen at the time they committed their offense because these juveniles lacked experience,
education, and intelligence compared to adults); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-
16 (1982) ("Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult.").
132. In 2002, the Court first used neuroscience to draw categorical conclusions about
culpability, though not in the context of juvenile offenders. In Atkins u. Virginia, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons.
536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002). The Atkins Court based its holding in no small part on its
conclusion that mentally retarded individuals lacked the cognitive capacity to warrant the
death penalty. Id. at 318 ("[T]here is abundant evidence that [persons with mental retarda-
tion] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group
settings they are followers rather than leaders."). For a more complete discussion of Atkins
and the cases referenced in note 131, see Carroll, supra note 3, at 562-66.
133. 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 572.
136. Id. at 572-73.
137. Id. at 567.
138. Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
139. Id. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason
of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
140. Id.
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juvenile could not be equated to that of an adult.14 ' Accordingly, the
Constitution prohibited the execution of child actors. 142
In the subsequent cases of Graham v. Florida4 3 and Miller v. Al-
abama,14 4 the Court held that given what was known about juvenile
decisionmaking processes and cognitive development, sentencing
juvenile offenders to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses
after a sentencing hearing45 and automatically for homicide offens-
es'4 6 categorically violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment.14 7
b. Youth, Reasonableness, and the Fifth Amendment
In 2011, a year after the Court's decision in Graham and the
year before Miller, the Supreme Court once again considered brain
science-this time in the context of the Miranda4 8 custody analy-
sis.14 9 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held that the test for
determining whether or not a juvenile was in custody must be eval-
uated based on what was reasonable for a juvenile, not what was
reasonable for an adult.50
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor ruled that a child
suspect's age was relevant in determining whether or not he rea-
sonably believed he was free to leave, and so was relevant to the
necessity of the Miranda warning. 151 Citing brain science data simi-
lar to that discussed in Roper and Graham, the Court noted that
the risk of coercion is "all the more acute" during youth.15 2 Accord-
141. Id. at 570.
142. Id. at 571-73 (holding that given juvenile's incomplete neurodevelopment, juvenile
offenders were neither the most culpable offenders nor did the death penalty offer a deter-
rent benefit).
143. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
144. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
145. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
146. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
147. The Court again rejected the need for an individualized analysis of the juvenile
offender in question, noting in Graham that "[c]ategorical rules tend to be imperfect ... one is
necessary here." 560 U.S. at 75. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that advances
in "psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juve-
nile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue
to mature through late adolescence." Id. at 68.
148. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that prior to question-
ing, suspects in police custody "must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.").
149. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-72 (2011).
150. Id. at 272.
151. Id. at 272, 277.
152. Id. at 269.
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ingly, officers and courts must take the suspect's youth into account
in determining whether or not Miranda should be administered.153
Justice Sotomayor noted that the law has long recognized that
children are different than adults and that they may feel bound to
submit to police questioning under circumstances in which an adult
might feel free to terminate the encounter.15 4 As a result, she con-
cluded that "a child's age must inform the Miranda custody analy-
sis" 155 and that this conclusion should apply to "children as a
class."15 6 She noted that unlike idiosyncratic or particularized char-
acteristics that the Court had previously rejected under the Miran-
da line, relevant characteristics including susceptibility to influence
and "outside pressures" were shared by all children and "in no way
involves a determination of how youth 'subjectively affect[s] the
mindset' of any particular child."15 7 In short, to understand the ef-
fect of the interrogation on J.D.B., Sotomayor reasoned that the
Court must put the event of the interrogation into the context of his
thirteen-year-old mindset. '' Further, to ignore the child's age in
this analysis undermines the purpose of Miranda's protection and
produces an artificial judicial inquiry that ignores the coercive ef-
fect of the interrogation on the juvenile defendant. '59 Courts must
therefore take the suspect's age into account when evaluating the
circumstances of the interrogation.16
B. Science and Kids'Brains
The Court's most recent line of cases on the difference of youth
draws heavily from a burgeoning body of scientific study. The emer-
gence of imaging technology, including fMRIs, coupled with longitu-
dinal studies have significantly increased our knowledge of adoles-
cent brain development.'' Emerging data suggests that adolescents
display four broad categories of traits that are relevant to legal doc-
trines.16 2 First, they lack maturity and have an underdeveloped
153. Id. at 277.
154. Id. at 264-65.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 272.
157. Id. at 275 (internal citations omitted).
158. Id. at 276, 278 n.9.
159. Id. at 278-79.
160. Id.
161. For a discussion of such advances, see B.J. Casey, Rebecca M. Jones & Todd A.
Hare, The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SC. 111, 115-16 (2008).
162. Though, as will be discussed shortly, there are admittedly limitations to the value
of this data. For a more detailed description of these findings, traits, and their limitations,
see Carroll, supra note 3, at 575-591.
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sense of responsibility. Second, they are more vulnerable or suscep-
tible to negative influences and outside pressure. Third, their char-
acter is not well formed, and their personalities are transitory.
Fourth, their decisionmaking processes differ from their adult coun-
terparts.16 3
Turning first to their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense
of responsibility, teens are "more likely both to underappreciate
risk 6 4 and [to] engage in reckless behavior."165 Compared to adults,
adolescents suffer deficiencies in their capacity for risk perception16 6
and the calculation of future consequences.'6 7 In real terms, this
means that adolescents tend to under-appreciate the risks they en-
gage in while overvaluing the reward or benefit of such risks. 161
Second, adolescents are especially vulnerable to outside influ-
ence and pressure. Compared to adults, adolescents not only
suffer deficiencies in their capacity for autonomous choice ' and
163. I do not mean to suggest that these four categories are not interlinked; in fact,
they are. But I do mean to suggest that each category presents different behavior and that
this behavior may have different legal consequences.
164. See Arnett, Reckless Behavior, supra note 16, at 344; Gardner, Life-Span Rational-
Choice Theory, supra note 16, at 78-79 (positing that a lack of life experience may account
for a willingness to take risks in adolescents); Scott et al., supra note 16, at 223; Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Fac-
tors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 249, 267-68 (1996). Elizabeth
Scott and Laurence Steinberg suggest that risk taking may be linked to an adolescent's
limited capacity to think hypothetically and into the future, which causes them to value
short-term gain or loss disproportionally. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra
note 14, at 814.
165. Carroll, supra note 3, at 581; see also Arnett, Reckless Behavior, supra note 16, at
344-46.
166. See Quadrel et al., supra note 16, at 111; see also Gardner & Herman, Adolescents'
AIDS Risk Taking, supra note 16, at 25-26 (noting that adolescents tend to be less risk
averse than adults and tend to weigh immediate rewards more heavily than future risks in
making choices).
167. See Greene, supra note 17, at 105-11 (noting that as individuals gain life experi-
ence they are better able to project events into the future).
168. See Beatriz Luna, David J. Paulsen, Aarthi Padmanabhan & Charles Geier, The
Teenage Brain: Cognitive Control and Motivation, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI.
94, 96-99 (2013) (describing studies cataloging adolescents heightened reward response
that may contribute to their failure to properly control or inhibit risky behavior); Adriana
Galvin, The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity to Rewards, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL.
SCI. 88, 90-91 (2013) (noting that adolescents display a heightened sensitivity to reward as
evidenced by an increased dopamine response to reward compared to adults).
169. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 164, at 253-54; see also Catherine C. Lewis,
How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy
Implications, 52 CHILD DEV. 538, 539 (1981); Luna et al., supra note 168, at 99 (noting that
even when adolescents are capable of exercising control akin to adults, they show less con-
sistency and less integration of brain processes in decisionmaking).
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self-management, 1o but they are also more susceptible to peer
influence."
Third, their personalities are not well developed and often shift
dramatically during adolescent development.'7 2 Adolescence is a pe-
riod in which children attempt to figure out where precisely they
"fit in," both in terms of their peer groups and in terms of adult so-
cial groups.7 3 As a result, adolescents may try different identities
on for size before settling on their more permanent adult persona.
Adolescent brain development and the corresponding maturity such
development generates is a constantly evolving event.7 4 As adoles-
cents grow, so do their decisionmaking capabilities and their identi-
ties.75
Finally, adolescents' decisionmaking processes differ significant-
ly from adults' decisionmaking processes. Generally, and not sur-
prisingly, studies of adolescents reveal that teens as a class are less
competent decisionmakers than adults.'76 Even as teens' cognitive
capacities approach that of adults in mid-adolescence, they are less
skilled than their adult counterparts in using these capacities to
make real-life decisions.77
From the standpoint of criminal law, each of the scientific con-
clusions outlined above are significant in their own right, but collec-
170. See Casey & Caudle, supra note 15, at 83, 86 (arguing that in emotional contexts
akin to real world situations, impulse control of adolescents is severely taxed relative to
adults or children).
171. See Dustin Albert, Jason Chein & Laurence Steinberg, The Teenage Brain: Peer
Influences on Adolescent Decision Making, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 114,
114-15 (2013) (describing heightened susceptibility to peer influence and resulting in-
creased risky behavior in adolescents); Leah H. Somerville, The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity
to Social Evaluation, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 121, 125 (2013) (noting dis-
proportionate effect of peer reaction on juveniles compared to adults).
172. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 14, at 801.
173. See B.J. Casey, The Teenage Brian: An Overview, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 80, 80 (2013).
174. See id.
175. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 164, at 260 (noting that both impulsivity
and sensation seeking increases between mid-adolescent years and early adulthood, but
declines thereafter).
176. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 14, at 801.
177. Even when adolescents show neural capacities on par with adults, other factors,
including external factors such as susceptibility to peer influence and internal factors such
as inefficient decisionmaking processes, result in poorer decisionmaking capabilities. See
Casey & Caudle, supra note 15, at 86; Luna et al., supra note 168, at 96-99; see also Shawn
L. Ward & Willis F. Overton, Semantic Familiarity, Relevance, and the Development of
Deductive Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 488, 492 (1990) (concluding that while
teens are capable of making decisions that approximate those of their adult counterparts in
familiar settings, their inability to fully engage in deductive reasoning and their limited
experiences render them comparatively poor decisionmakers in unfamiliar situations).
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tively they confirm that the behavior and curtailed decisionmaking
they describe are the products of normal adolescent development and
are common across the age class. These characteristics distinguish
adolescents from adults.78 They confirm that adolescents engage in
different decisionmaking processes than adults do as a necessary and
ordinary part of their development.'7
As valuable as this science is in explaining adolescent brain devel-
opment and thought processes, it has its limitations. First, it risks
"over application." While there has been a historical lure to use sci-
ence as a means of injecting certainty into legal classifications and
sentences, there is no data that suggests that current neurological
studies can either predict future criminal activity or determine a
mental state in the past.80 Likewise, while science is able to describe
general adolescent characteristics, such generalizations fail to pro-
vide any information about whether or not a particular defendant
suffers the described traits.'8 ' The information about what is common
among adolescents may provide little insight into how a fact finder
should treat a particular adolescent who happens to be the defend-
ant. This problem of making generalizations from the data is further
complicated by evidence of variations within the general class of ado-
lescence. Girls, for example, mature more quickly than boys.'8 2 Induc-
tion of trauma before and during adolescence can alter developmen-
tal trajectories in unpredictable and highly individualized ways.18 3
Factors such as IQ, learning disabilities, and mental illness all intro-
duce variables that can alter adolescent development as described in
studies.18 4 Given the number of moving parts in any analysis of ado-
lescent brain development, the utility of scientific studies to a legal
analysis may appear dubious.
Beyond these critiques, the science and its findings remain rela-
tively nascent and opaque. While it may be clear that an adolescent
may be particularly susceptible to outside influence or that he may
engage in a different decisionmaking process than his adult counter-
178. Casey & Caudle, supra note 15, at 82-83 (noting that while it may be understand-
able to characterize adolescent behavior as deviant given high rates of mental health issues
and crime during this period, this over-generalization is inaccurate).
179. Id. at 82 (cautioning against pathologizing adolescent behavior and noting that
risk-taking and immature decisionmaking are necessary components of maturing).
180. See, e.g., Bonnie & Scott, The Teenage Brain, supra note 14, at 160-61; Buss, supra
note 14, at 133-34; Maroney, Brain Science After Graham, supra note 14, at 769-72;
Maroney, False Promise, supra note 14, at 94, 146-49; Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note
14, at 47-48.
181. See, e.g., Maroney, False Promise, supra note 14, at 94, 146-49.
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parts, it remains unclear what effect that should have on substantive
criminal law's analysis. Even as the Court has identified some value
to generalized discussions of adolescent brain development (despite
the critics' warnings), it has limited the use of such material to two
narrow realms. The underdeveloped nature of the adolescent brain
may have given the Court pause in attempting to discern if a child
was truly the worst of the worst for sentencing purposes,8 5 or if the
child reasonably believed he was in custody for Miranda purposes.8 6
But does it or should it have the same effect in the context of sub-
stantive criminal law's analysis of elements and guilt? And how, as a
practical matter, might the system recognize the crucial difference
between juvenile and adult decisionmaking? To answer these ques-
tions, it is informative to examine a second area of scientific study,
one that focuses not on the accused juvenile but rather on the adult
fact finder.
C. Science and How Adults Think About Facts
Despite having once been adolescents, it is clear that developmen-
tally normal adults do not share adolescent thought processes. Ma-
turity and its corresponding neurobiological development alters not
only the physical structure of the brain but the mechanisms by which
adults make decisions and judge risks and rewards.' This change
not only bodes well for society but impacts the way that adults inter-
pret facts. While adults may remember decisions made as teenagers,
they are unlikely to remember the thought processes that produced
such decisions. To the contrary, they are likely to impose their own
thought processes onto such decisions'8 8-often concluding that what
seemed like a great idea in youth was, in retrospect, a bad idea.
In the context of criminal law, generally, and in assessing a de-
fendant's state of mind, in particular, these studies suggest that con-
185. See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Roper line).
186. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text (discussing J.D.B.).
187. See Charles A. Nelson III et al., Neural Bases of Cognitive Development, in CHILD
AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT: AN ADVANCED COURSE 19, 25, 38-40 (William Damon &
Richard M. Lerner eds., 2008) (describing the development of the brain from childhood to
adulthood).
188. See Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Oth-
ers Know: Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 745-49
(1999) (comparing studies that indicate people tend to attribute their own thought process-
es to others in assessing facts); Boaz Keysar et al., States of Affairs and States of Mind: The
Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs, 64 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 283, 284
(1995) ("[P]eople's tendency to behave as if others have access to their own privileged in-
formation-even when they are fully aware that they do not."). For an excellent discussion
of this interpretive failure in the context of judicial decisionmaking, see Matthew Tokson,
Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 913-16 (2015).
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trary to Justice Sotomayor's claim, a fact finder's ability to evaluate a
juvenile's perspective may not be intuitive at all.'89 In fact, it is dubi-
ous to assume an adult fact finder, merely because he or she was at
one point an adolescent, is capable of accurately assessing the juve-
nile's state of mind based on circumstantial evidence. While adults
may be capable of remembering their youth, adults lack the ability to
replicate their youthful thought processes. Therefore, they are more
likely to mistakenly interpret state of mind evidence through the ru-
bric of their own adult thought processes.
III. CONSTRUCTING PROOF
Armed with a basic understanding of the jurisprudence of youth
and neuroscientific conclusions surrounding adolescent brain devel-
opment, this Part turns to the evidentiary construct of proof in crimi-
nal law, in particular, the role of relevance and inference. When courts
and scholars speak of evidence, they often resort to epistemological
dichotomies. Evidence is either testimonial or physical;'90 relevant or
not;'9' direct or circumstantial.'9 2 Each division is driven by the desire
to find truth.1 9 3 But these categorizations alone are insufficient to ac-
complish the goal of decisional accuracy. Additional classifications and
protections regulate the admission of evidence and the narrative of a
trial in the hope of providing fact finders with the necessary infor-
mation upon which to deliberate while excluding information that is
either irrelevant to the decision before the fact finder or likely to pro-
duce decisional inaccuracy.1
189. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 279-80 (2011) ("[O]fficers and judges
need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive
science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child's age. They
simply need the common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is
an adult."). As will be discussed further in Part IV, this portion of the decision was heavily
criticized by the dissent for the assumption that understanding that a child thinks differently
is not the same as understanding how a child thinks. See id. at 293-94 (Alito, J., dissenting).
190. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 25, at 224-25 (2d ed. 1923) (noting that testimony is
"information derived ... from those who had actual knowledge of the fact[s]" and physical
evidence is either objects or conduct capable of being assessed through "actual and personal
observation" by the fact finder (citing 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE AND DIGEST OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS § 13 (1824))).
191. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (permitting the admission of relevant evidence and the ex-
clusion of irrelevant evidence).
192. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 1000-01 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that "[d]irect
evidence is evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue" and circumstantial evi-
dence, even if true, requires "additional reasoning ... to reach the desired conclusion").
193. See Nesson, supra note 1, at 1194 ("The generally articulated and popularly under-
stood objective of the trial system is to determine the truth about a particular disputed event.").
194. Protections such as disclosure requirements, see, e.g., The Jencks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012) (requiring disclosure of prior statements of testifying witnesses);
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As substantive criminal law defines the elements of an offense and
defenses to it, relevancy is defined not only in terms of what the evi-
dence directly shows but also in terms of what may be inferred from
this evidence. In this, relevancy and inference are joined. Inference
allows a fact finder to conclude a fact based on the establishment of
another fact.'9 6 As a practical matter, inferences ease proof require-
ments, allowing fact finders to draw conclusions about one fact based
on their interpretation of another.97 Inferences are not without their
limitations, however; they must be supported by credible evidence and
pertain to an element to be proven. An assessment of the "relevancy" of
circumstantial evidence hinges on the inference of a fact it seeks to
prove and its relationship to the proof of that fact.98 The more remote
the relationship between the evidence and the fact it might prove, the
higher the risk that the evidence is not probative.'99 Likewise, even if
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C) (requiring disclosure of the basis of an expert's opinion); im-
peachment, see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 607-09, 801(d); corroboration, see MCCORMICK, supra
note 192, § 145 (describing the rationale for the requirement of corroboration); rules of
production, see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 703, 705 (describing production and disclosure require-
ments for expert witnesses); see also New Jersey v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J.
2011) (ordering production of eye witness identification protocols); and jury instruction, see,
e.g., ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.17, Testimony of an Accomplice (instructing jurors
to view the testimony of an accomplice with suspicion and caution), all limit or seek to
guide the fact finder's access to evidence. These protections work in lock step with re-
strictions imposed by the Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403-15 (all excluding
otherwise "relevant" evidence based on potential prejudicial effect). Such regulations are
premised on the entwined notions that evidence must be both relevant and reliable in or-
der to warrant admission, with reliable being defined broadly as avoiding prejudice or the
promotion of inaccurate decisionmaking by the fact finder.
195. See George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689,
690 (1941) ("Relevancy, as the word itself indicates, is not an inherent characteristic of any
item of evidence but exists as a relation between an item of evidence and a proposition
sought to be proved.").
196. For example, if a fact finder concludes that it is proven that the defendant was at
a still during its operation, federal aw permits the fact finder to also conclude that the
defendant operated the still. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1965). This
inference was permissive, meaning the jury did not have to infer the second fact, even upon
proof of the first fact. Id. Not all "still" related inferences faired as well, however. Months
after the decision in Gainey, in Romano, the Court struck down a statute authorizing ju-
rors to infer that a person present at the still was in "possession or custody, or ... control."
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137 n.4, 137-38 (1965); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)
(1970) (repealed 1976). The Court distinguished the two cases by noting that Gainey had to
be present while the still was operating, but Romano only had to be present at the still,
operating or otherwise, for the inferences to be triggered. Romano, 382 U.S. at 141. In each
case and later cases, as will be discussed further in Section III.B., the inferences were sup-
ported by circumstantial evidence that supported a finding of guilt.
197. See Nesson, supra note 1, at 1187 ("Legislatures typically enact permissive infer-
ences in order to assist prosecutors in proving criminal offenses when the prosecution's best
evidence on one of the elements is (a) wholly circumstantial and (b) not entirely convincing.").
198. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's notes to 1972 proposed rules.
199. Id.
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the relationship is close, if the fact proven does not demonstrate an
element of the offense, or support a permissible defense, its materiality
may be called into question.20o Thus, questions of relevancy are inher-
ently entwined with questions of what type of inferences should be
permitted in criminal law, when circumstantial evidence may prove an
element, and what type of circumstantial evidence may be allowed.
And so begins the cycle between inference and relevancy-evidence
may be relevant because it supports the inference of a fact, but the in-
ference is only permitted if its conclusion is relevant to the question
before the fact finder. To disentangle questions of relevancy and infer-
ence is to unpack criminal law's proof requirement.
A. Disentangling Relevancy
Relevancy is the threshold to admissibility.20' Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 401 establishes the test for relevancy in terms of probative val-
ue o0 and materiality.203 But defining these terms is an elusive task. As
then-not-yet Justice Holmes suggested, the limits of relevancy are "a
concession to the shortness of life." 2 04 If all evidence were admissible
because it in some way altered the probability of a material element,
trials would end in exhaustion and bewilderment, and rarely accurate
verdicts.2 0 5 Instead, Holmes suggested that the value of relevancy lay
in its ability to limit the story parties told. In fact, Article IV of the
200. Id.
201. See RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 139 (3d ed. 2002) ("Relevancy is the foundational principle for all
modern systems of evidence law."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE § 4.1, at 151 (4th ed. 2009) ("The most fundamental evidentiary principle is the
requirement of relevancy. . . . Relevancy is thus the primary threshold etermination that
must be made for each item of proffered evidence."); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.02[1], at 401-555 (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., 2d ed. 2011) ("The concept [of relevance] is, however, fundamental to the law
of evidence; it is the cornerstone on which any rational system of evidence rests."); James,
supra note 195, at 689 ("Since scholars first attempted to treat the common law of evidence
as a rational system, relevancy has been recognized as a basic concept underlying all fur-
ther discussion."); Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV.
447, 447 (1990) ("The cornerstone of modern evidence law is relevance."). Some scholars
contest this characterization, arguing that "foundation" is in fact the threshold to admissi-
bility, with relevance following as a close second. See David S. Schwartz, A Foundation
Theory of Evidence, 100 GEO. L.J. 95, 99 (2011) (arguing that foundation requires that "ev-
idence be case-specific, assertive, and probably true" and "[a]s such, it is a logical precondi-
tion for relevance").
202. See FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . . .").
203. Id. ("Evidence is relevant if: ... (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action."); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 192, § 185 ("Materiality concerns the fit between
the evidence and the case.").
204. Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (Mass. 1887).
205. Id.; James, supra note 195, at 700-01.
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Federal Rules of Evidence allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence
on the grounds that it may produce decisional inaccuracy.o6
And so, substantive criminal law and evidentiary rules seek to de-
fine relevancy in terms of ever-narrowing circles around the event or
events in question.207 Substantive criminal law defines elements that
the state must prove and the defenses that may be offered in response.
These elements serve as a guide as the rules of evidence sheer away
collateral issues and concerns to admit only the "relevant" evidence. As
the law cabins the narrative the fact finder will hear and judge, the
rules of evidence narrow the scope of the narrative until the fact finder
is left only with the most essential of stories. The theory of relevancy is
that in this narrowing the fact finder may focus on the question at
hand and arrive at some truth untainted by distraction or prejudice.2 08
The defendant's alleged act, committed with a particular mens rea,
which produced a result, in the presence of particular attendant cir-
cumstances are the requisites for a guilty verdict (or in the presence of
a defense, a not guilty verdict). A defendant accused of bringing a gun
to a party and firing a shot at a rival may face an assault with a deadly
weapon charge. The story of his guilt will unfold in terms of the ele-
ments of his charge: that the defendant did intentionally engage in
conduct which placed another in fear of imminent injury through the
use of a deadly weapon, to wit a gun.
As each witness takes the stand and recalls some part or all of the
component parts of the offense or defense in response to the ques-
tions of direct and cross examination they narrate the story of the
verdict. They offer to the fact finder a glimpse of a moment upon
which the fact finder must then render judgment. The defendant was
there; the witness saw him. The defendant fired the shot; the witness
smelled the smoke and heard the shot. The defendant's hands tested
positive for lead, antimony, and barium-the trilogy that compose
gunshot residue;20 the witness ran a test. Likewise, the introduction
of physical objects contributes to the narrative. Their presence sug-
206. See FED. R. EVID. 403-13 (all excluding relevant evidence because of potential
prejudicial effect).
207. It could certainly be argued that procedural law also imposes limitations on the
admission of evidence without the goal of achieving accuracy. See Tom Stacy, The Search
for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1374-77
(1991) (arguing that Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as the develop-
ment of privilege, serve to exclude evidence that may promote truth finding functions).
208. See James, supra note 195, at 701.
209. See Allison C. Murtha & Linxian Wu, The Science Behind GSR: Separating Fact




gests or confirms a fact. The gun was found on the defendant when
he was arrested. It is real. It could fire a shot.
This story told in court is often nonlinear and nonsequential. It is
jagged and told in the starts and stops as each witness testifies and is
inevitably interrupted by objections and their accompanying legal ar-
guments and recesses. It is, by its nature, a story bounded on all sides
by the terms the law sets forth-both in terms of what may be told and
how it may be told.
It is, more often than not, bad storytelling, but it serves a purpose
that exceeds its literary value. The story told in court is a compact one
surrounding a particular moment and the consequences of that mo-
ment. That which proves or disproves an element directly is relevant,
and barring other concerns, is admissible as evidence. That which does
not is not relevant and is, therefore, not admissible.
That the defendant had a difficult childhood, misunderstood the
nature of the party he was attending, or has a prior conviction for theft
are all likely irrelevant to the question of his guilt. These facts and cir-
cumstances may admittedly provide more detail, help on some level to
explain the defendant's actions, or even render a material fact more or
less likely, but they are simply too remote and pose too great a risk of
injecting prejudice or distraction that they would likely fail Holmes'
and Article IV's relevancy test and could be excluded.
Accuracy in decisionmaking is preserved in narrow circles of rele-
vancy. Limitations on what is deemed relevant help to focus the fact
finder on pertinent questions of credibility and proof. These limitations
are necessary in a system fraught with accuracy hazards. Evidence by
its nature can give rise to decisional inaccuracy. Human sources suffer
a litany of potential risks. A witness may be insincere or inarticulate.
She may make errors in memory or in perception. Likewise, a physical
object, unless offered as evidence of its very existence, demands inter-
pretation by the fact finder to be rendered relevant. This act of inter-
pretation may skew the tale the evidence would tell.
Other evidentiary rules and procedural protections serve to guard
against these inaccuracies.2 1 0 As relevancy confines the scope of the in-
court narrative in the hopes of promoting accurate decisionmaking,
rules of exclusion, disclosure, impeachment, corroboration coupled
with jury instructions seek both to exclude noncredible evidence and to
empower fact finders with sufficient information to discern inaccura-
210. The hypothetical defendant mentioned above may exclude testimony relating to his
prior conviction, even if it is found relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. Likewise, he or the state may prevent hearsay evidence or supposition.
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cy."n These protections eek to guard against the common dangers of
insincerity, erroneous memory, faulty perception, the ambiguity of
language itself, and false inference. And while the parameters of pro-
tections may vary both in existence and effectiveness depending on the
jurisdiction and the judicial actor interpreting them, their presence
speaks to a desire to promote accurate decisionmaking by controlling
not only the evidence the fact finder considers but the form and scope
of that evidence. Assessments of relevancy serve an important gate-
keeping function for these exclusions-permitting limitations on the
narrative in the name of promoting accuracy.
This approach to evidence and proof inevitably presents an incom-
plete or partial narrative to the fact finder. Inevitably, only part of the
story is told. Criminal law unfolds as a snapshot, a single moment in a
defendant's and victim's life. Despite this limitation, however, this ap-
proach to evidence and proof is also premised on the notion that fact
finders are capable of not only hearing the story of the case with all its
limitations and disjointed narrative but also interpreting that unlikely
story in a way that is consistent with the law's aim of an accurate and
just result.
This act of interpretation is a critical and potentially fraught mo-
ment for criminal law. It requires a fact finder-often a lay person
serving as juror-to consider the law as written and to apply that law
to the facts of the case as he or she understands them to be, based not
only on what evidence was presented but also on what the fact finder
knows of the world around him or her. For all the hard work that evi-
dentiary and legal rules may do, ultimately judgments of credibility,
relevancy, truth, and guilt come down to the fact finder's assessment of
the evidence itself. In this decision, accuracy is a product of both the
law's regulation of the narrative of the case and the fact finder's un-
derstanding of that narrative based on his or her life experience. Here,
relevancy and inference entwine.
B. Disentangling Inference
The use of inference or presumption"' in criminal law as a mecha-
nism of proof opens the possibility that relevancy can, and should be,
defined in ever-widening circles. Inference allows a fact to be proven by
211. While relevancy serves an important gate-keeping function, alone it is insufficient to
ensure accurate decisionmaking. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's notes to 1972
proposed rules. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 notes that "[r]elevant evidence is admissible
unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal stat-
ute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court." FED. R. EVID. 402.
212. The terms inference and presumption both refer to the concept that one fact may be
proven by proof of another. For the purpose of ease, I will use the term inference, though courts
and scholars use both.
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proof of another fact. 2 1 3 The concept of inference suffers its own binary
constructs. Inference may be mandatory214 or permissive,1 5 the prod-
uct of circumstantial evidence 2 16 or statute.2 1 7 Statutory inferences are
most common around areas of public safety concerns such as narcotics,
alcohol, or weapon regulation.2 1 8 Nonstatutory inferences tend to focus
on the state of mind element.2 19
Jurors are instructed that they may infer a defendant's state of
mind from his conduct.2 2 0 A jury may infer a defendant's intent to dis-
213. The principle of inference is long established in American criminal jurisprudence. De-
fendants are presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of their conduct. See
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1979); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 430 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952).
214. Mandatory inferences are often called "true" or "conclusive" presumptions and require
the fact finder to draw the inference from the proof of the predicate fact unless the defendant
rebuts it. See Julian P. Alexander, Presumptions: Their Use and Abuse, 17 Miss. L.J. 1, 4-6
(1945); Jeffries, Jr. & Stephan III, supra note 2, at 1335. Some legal scholars distinguish conclu-
sive presumptions from mandatory presumptions, defining conclusive presumptions as foreclos-
ing any further argument once the predicate fact is shown. See Neil S. Hecht & William M.
Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions: Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. REV. 527, 529 (1978).
215. Permissive inferences are also called "nonmandatory presumptions" or "permissive
presumptions" and allow the fact finder to infer one fact from the proof of another. As their
name suggests, they do not require the fact finder to make the inference. See Cty. Court of Ul-
ster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165-67 (1979) (holding permissive inference instruction with
regard to an element of an offense is constitutional if the instruction with respect to the element
makes it clear that each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is a
rational connection between the predicate and inferred facts, and that the inferred facts are
more likely than not to flow from the predicate facts); Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional Limits on
Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of Changing Concepts of Fundamental Fairness, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 310 (1986); Jeffries, Jr. & Stephan III, supra note 2, at 1335-36;
Peter D. Bewley, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 341, 343 (1970).
216. See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
601, 691-96 [hereinafter Denno, Post-Freudian] (describing jury instructions regarding inference
based on the introduction of circumstantial evidence).
217. See Allen Fuller & Robert Urich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutory Pre-
sumptions That Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 420, 420 (1971); Jef-
fries, Jr. & Stephan III, supra note 2, at 1335.
218. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1970) (statute permitted
inference that heroin was imported based on possession); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6, 37 (1969) (statute permitted inference that marijuana was imported based on posses-
sion); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 64 (1965) (statute permitted inference that
defendant operated still from presence); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137
(1965) (statute permitted inference that defendant operated still from presence); Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943) (statute permitted inference of transportation of
firearm by interstate or foreign commerce from the possession of a firearm).
219. See Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 327-28
(2017) [hereinafter Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent]; Denno, Post-Freudian, supra note
216, at 692-93 (discussing jury instructions on permissive inference of the state of mind
element from proof of conduct).
220. See Denno, Post-Freudian, supra note 216, at 691, 698 app. tbl. 1 (showing thirty-
three states and the District of Columbia permit an inference of a mental state from con-
duct or other circumstantial evidence); Julie Schmidt Chauvin, Comment, 'For It Must
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tribute narcotics from the quantity of drugs found in his possession,
for example.2 2' That the defendant either actively denies this state of
mind, or that there may be a myriad of alternative explanations, does
not undo the permissive inference. Likewise, that the conduct in
question either precedes or proceeds the criminal act does not undo
its inferential value as circumstantial evidence. Put another way, a
defendant's flight from the scene of a crime2 2 2 or his preparation for a
potential crime both suffice as circumstantial evidence for state of
mind inferences.2 2 3
At its most basic level, an inference eases proof requirements by
allowing the state to bootstrap proof of a fact through the proof of an-
other.2 2 4 There is a necessity to their easing; scholars and courts have
long recognized that without inference, it would often be impossible to
prove mental states.2 An inference can also contain a burden-shifting
component.2 2' For this, the concept of inference has received substantial
Seem Their Guilt'" Diluting Reasonable Doubt by Rejecting the Reasonable Hypothesis of
Innocence Standard, 53 LoY. L. REV. 217, 218-22 (2007).
221. See United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1169 (8th Cir. 2014) ("A large quanti-
ty of narcotics alone provides sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to infer an intent
to distribute it."); Francis Paul Greene, Comment, I Ain't Got No Body: The Moral Uncer-
tainty of Bodiless Murder Jurisprudence in New York After People v. Bierenbaum, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2863, 2876 (2003) ("With circumstantial evidence, [fact finders] must
make a leap of logic and infer the existence of a fact at issue, connecting a circumstantial
fact to a directly incriminating fact.").
222. See, e.g., Thompson v. Maryland, 901 A.2d 208, 218-19 (Md. 2006); Rhode Island v.
Perry, 725 A.2d 264, 266 (R.I. 1999) (permitting a jury instruction on inference of state of
mind based on the defendant's flight after the crime). But see Alberty v. United States, 162
U.S. 499, 511 (1896) (noting that a desire to avoid contact with the police is not necessarily
indicative of a guilty mind). Outside of the context of mens rea, flight has served as a basis
for the suspicion required for a brief stop under the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-26 (2000).
223. See Wright, 739 F.3d at 1169 (holding that the defendant's accumulation of narcot-
ics even prior to distribution could be used as evidence of his intent to distribute).
224. See Nesson, supra note 1, at 1188-89; see also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
36 (1969); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88 (1934).
225. See 29A Am. JUR. 2D EVID. § 1392 (2015); see also United States v. Sullivan, 522
F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Intent may be established through circumstantial evi-
dence."); CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 411 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that the proof of mental state through inference is,
in some cases, "indispensable"); see also United States v. Stoker, 706 F.3d 643, 646 (5th
Cir. 2013) ("Intent may, and generally must, be proven circumstantially." (quoting United
States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861,
867 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that a jury "rarely has direct evidence of a defendant's
knowledge, [and] it is generally established through circumstantial evidence" (quoting
United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994)).
226. To rebut an inference, a defendant may have to present evidence that offers an
alternative explanation for the proven fact. See Alexander, supra note 214, at 3 n.6; Harold
A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Crimi-
nal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 172-73 (1969); Bewley, supra note
215, at 343 n.21 ("The import of the language appears to be that a procedure shifting to the
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criticism.227 Although each of these critiques is valid, they arguably ne-
glect the reality that inference simply gives a name to a process that
fact finders likely engage in any way in rendering a verdict. 2 2 8
A more fundamental flaw with the concept of inference is that it is
premised on a notion that any fact finder can accurately use infer-
ences to reach a particular conclusion.2 2 9 This idea that one fact car-
ries universal and knowable meaning in the context of the mental
state element is particularly problematic.230 In fact, depending on the
defendant's thought process, the meaning of an act or omission can
change.2 3' This reality is recognized not only in constitutional protec-
tions and procedural and evidentiary rules that set guidelines for the
admission of evidence but in statutory and common law defenses, such
as self-defense, battered women's/battered child's defenses, cultural
defenses, some mental health based defenses (such as the PTSD de-
fense),2 3 2 and in mitigating defenses (such as mistake of fact and law). 2 3 3
defendant the burden of proof on an element of the crime would be unconstitutional, while
one putting the burden of proof of an affirmative defense on him is not."); Nesson, supra
note 1, at 1214-15. Some inferences shift burdens of production as opposed to burdens of
persuasion. See Bewley, supra note 215, at 343.
227. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, supra note 226; James, supra note 195, at 690-92; Nes-
son, supra note 1, at 1192. The Supreme Court has also held some inferences to be unconsti-
tutional per se. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-24 (1979) (holding that an
irrebutable presumption that an element of a crime exists is unconstitutional); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (holding a rebuttable presumption that shifted the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant violated the Due Process Clause); see also Harris, supra
note 215, at 309.
228. See Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll's Mental State or What is Meant by Intent, 38 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 71, 102 (2001) (noting that allowing jurors to infer a mental state from action
not only mirrors what is likely occurring in deliberation but avoids "fruitless inquiry into
mental processes").
229. See James, supra note 195, at 695-697 (noting that inferences only work if facts upon
which they are based carry universal or near universal meanings); Nesson, supra note 1, at
1192-95 (arguing that there is a value in complexity that is often lost in pursuit of the ease of
inference and universal meanings).
230. See Denno, Post-Freudian, supra note 216, at 692-96 (using jury instructions to high-
light particular interpretive conflicts that may arise around inferences of mental state from
the defendant); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Minds/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 143, 158-59 (2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1275 (2000) [hereinafter Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes] ("[J]uror[s]
often must infer the actor's state of mind from conduct open to numerous interpretations.").
231. See Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes, supra note 230, at 1275 (observing that the
juror's interpretation of a fact often hinges on the juror's personal experiences).
232. Each of these defenses permit the introduction of evidence that might otherwise be
excluded as irrelevant, including the defendant's past interactions with the victim, prior acts
of violence, prior traumatic experiences unrelated to the crime (such as war experiences or
childhood abuse), and medical evidence of illness or injury unconnected to the crime itself. See
generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 16-20 (7th ed. 2015) (discuss-
ing proof requirements and relevancy for defenses).
233. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, at 267 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Mistake of law and fact
defenses emphasize the circumstances as the actor believes them to be rather than as they
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Constitutional due process,2 3 4 the right to counsel,2 3 5 the right to
an impartial jury,2 3 6 the right against self-incrimination,2 3 7 and the
double jeopardy clause2 3 8 all carry with them procedural protections
designed to promote both fairness and decisional accuracy. These
protections seek to guard against the possibility that a conviction is
the product of something other than the fact finder's careful delibera-
tion of reliable evidence presented at trial.2 39
Similarly, rules of evidence seek to ensure decisional accuracy by
limiting information provided to fact finders. The rules of evidence
limit admissibility in a variety of ways. Experts may not opine on the
ultimate issue of fact regarding mens rea.2 4 0 Hearsay is not generally
admissible.2 4' Neither testimony nor physical evidence may be intro-
duced without first establishing its foundation.2 42 Information about a
actually exist. Id. at 297.
234. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (holding that while not present in the text
of the Constitution, beyond a reasonable doubt burdens of proof and the presumption of inno-
cence were critical components of due process and served to protect against wrongful conviction).
235. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) ("The Sixth Amendment [and the right to counsel contained there-
in] stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost,
justice will not 'still be done.'" (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
236. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ."); Jenny Carroll, The Jury
as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 841-42 (2015) (discussing the necessity of a diverse jury
in ensuring accurate and legitimate outcomes in criminal trials); see also Duren v. Mis-
souri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-68 (1979) (discussing the importance of procedural mechanism
that promote the selection of a representative jury).
237. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . ."). This right against self-incrimination prohibits the
fact finder from inferring the defendant's guilt from his silence and instead requires the
fact finder's verdict to be based on evidence offered. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
212, 213 n.11, 215-16 (1988) (prohibiting the use of silence at trial to infer guilt); Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965) (prohibiting the use of pre- and post-arrest silence
to infer guilt).
238. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . . ."); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
239. That these constitutional protections may fail or be deficient in some way-and I
do not doubt their day-to-day mechanisms could be improved upon-does not undermine
their aim.
240. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) ("In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.").
241. FED. R. EVID. 802 (stating "[h]earsay is not admissible" unless it falls within some
exception to the hearsay rule); see Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Applica-
tion of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 188-90 (1948) (noting hearsay risks
particular dangers of insincerity, ambiguity, memory loss, and misperception).
242. See FED. R. EVID. 104 (requiring the court to answer preliminary questions before
permitting the admission of evidence); Schwartz, supra note 201, at 98.
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witness's character or other bad acts is generally not admissible.24 3
Leading questions are prohibited on direct examination.244 This list
goes on, but in each restriction to admissibility, the rules recognize
not only the frailties of evidence itself but also that fact finders may
be ill-equipped to dodge potentially prejudicial or distracting materi-
al. Taken together with procedural rules that set limits on how and
when evidence may be presented, these rules seek to hone the fact
finders' interpretive powers.2 4 5
All of these limitations, whether rule-based or constitutionally-
based, are premised on the notion that decisionmaking by fact finders
must be guided, and that fact finders may make inaccurate or unreli-
able decisions if they are not guided.2 46 This suggests that the mean-
ing a fact finder may draw from any given fact will shift as exposure
to other facts shift.2 4 7 Put another way, the need for these limitations
suggests that the significance of a fact to any given element is not
constant, but is a product of the context in which it is presented.
Likewise, defenses may hinge on the defendant's ability to per-
suade the fact finder that ordinarily prohibited conduct, viewed
through the lens of the defendant's experiences and thought process,
may be excused or mitigated. These defenses require the fact finder
to assess the defendant's mental state in the context of her thought
process and perception of her circumstances.2 4 8 Mistake of law and
mistake of fact defenses mitigate the mental state element by em-
phasizing the circumstances as the actor believes them to be rather
than as they actually exist. This subjective approach requires the fact
finder to judge the defendant's mental state based on the defendant's
mistaken perception of the world. Self-defense asks the fact finder to
determine not only if the defendant's use of force was proportional
but also her perception of the risk she faced and her available re-
sponse.249 A battered women's or battered child's defense or a PTSD
243. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (limiting the introduction of character evidence and evi-
dence of prior crimes or bad acts).
244. See 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 769-79 (3d ed. 1940) (noting that evidentiary re-
strictions on impeachment of one's own witnesses resulted in a general prohibition on lead-
ing a witness during direct examination).
245. See Roth, supra note 5, at 1984-85 (noting that a variety of procedural and eviden-
tiary rules as discussed above seek to promote accurate decisionmaking by fact finders).
246. See supra notes 234-44.
247. Context and complexity can shift perceptions of facts. See Denno, Concocting
Criminal Intent, supra note 219, at 325-27; Nesson, supra note 1, at 1192, 1194-95193.
248. See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 258-63, 265 (1987)
(categorizing mitigation defenses as based on either the circumstances the actor faced (jus-
tification), or the actor's mental differences or other deficiencies (excuse)).
249. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, at 30-31 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) ("[T]he use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is im-
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defense asks the fact finder to make similar judgments-to account
for the defendant's particular trauma and its effect on her assess-
ment of risk and response.250 Finally, cultural defenses seek to con-
textualize the defendant's actions based on cultural norms that may
be foreign (literally and figuratively) to the fact finder.25 1 In each of
these, the use of an inference is not curtailed-the fact finder is still
permitted to infer a mental state from evidence of the defendant's act
or acts. Rather, the inference is contextualized in recognition that the
defendant's state of mind may be the product of factors and perspec-
tives that the average fact finder may not share.252
mediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself ..... (emphasis added)); see also
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 18.01, .05 (5th ed. 2009); Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement
Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 195-97, 200 (1998).
250. See DRESSLER, supra note 249. An impressive amount of scholarship has been
devoted to the discussion and development of battered women's defenses. For a sampling of
literature discussing the development of these defenses, see, for example, ELIZABETH
BOCHNAK, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 42-48 (1981); CHARLES
P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTI-
FICATION 45-47 (1987); THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DO-
MESTIC ABUSE 3-6 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994); Linda L. Am-
mons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-
American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 5 WIs. L. REV. 1003, 1004-06 (1995);
Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's Use of
the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 2-5
(1994); Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough:
The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 141, 141-42 (1995); Julie
Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Bat-
tered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 227, 227-28 (1986); Anne M. Cough-
lin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (1994); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of
Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121,
121-22 (1985); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1280-87
(2001); Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batter-
ers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 371-78 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and General-
ity: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 520, 520-27 (1992); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1574 (1993).
251. See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets he
Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939-41 (2007); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture:
Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense", 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 76-77 (1994); Katie L.
Zaunbrecher, Comment, When Culture Hurts: Dispelling the Myth of Cultural Justification
for Gender-Based Human Rights Violations, 33 HOUS. J. INT'LL. 679, 681-82 (2011).
252. Admittedly, the inference the fact finder may make with regard to such defenses
may also be influenced by the fact finder's own bias. This reality has received significant
attention as of late in the context of self-defense. See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reason-
able Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of
Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 (1998)
("[C]ourts have slowly come to accept the widespread scholarly belief that the formal neu-
trality of the objective standard is systematically biased against the self-defense and prov-
ocation claims of individuals from groups that lack significant economic, political, and so-
cial power in American society-particularly women, the poor, and nonwhites."); Cynthia
Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Soci-
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As a result, the question that the fact finder might seek to answer
becomes not just "what would the defendant's actions signify in my
own life?" but also "what would the defendant's actions signify if my
own life mirrored hers?" In this subtle difference lies the heart of a
theory of culpability that strives to move from imagined to actual-to
convict and punish based on what the defendant did, as opposed to
what he might have done.
It is crucial, therefore, to re-center the point of reference for any
such inference to the defendant's actual thought process. In doing so,
the fact finder may require evidence that might previously have been
seen as tangential, and therefore irrelevant and excludable. Ques-
tions on topics as diverse as the defendant's past relationship with
the victim, past traumatic events unrelated to the victim, biases,
physical injury, and mental health history become part of a larger
context and a necessary component to the proper assessment of the
defendant's mental state. That which criminal courts would normally
seek to exclude as irrelevant is rendered critical to the fact finder's
ability to properly interpret evidence.
IV. PROOF, SCIENCE, AND THE PROBLEM WITH INFERENCE
Recent neuroscience studies and the jurisprudence that has devel-
oped around them suggest that juvenile defendants present a partic-
ular challenge for substantive criminal law and its reliance on infer-
ence to prove a defendant's mental state. The juvenile justice system
is premised on the notion that kids are different than adults. The
Progressives recognized this in the creation of the stand-alone juve-
nile justice system,2 5 3 and the Court recognized this as it sought bal-
ance in a post-Gault juvenile justice system.2 5 4 Courts and lawmakers
have addressed this difference largely in the procedural realm, de-
ety, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1580-86 (2013) (surveying social science studies that demon-
strate the effect implicit racial bias has on the perception of fear); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 367, 402-23 (1996) [hereinafter Lee, Race and Self-Defense] (explicating the "Black-as-
criminal" stereotype); V.F. Nourse, supra note 250, at 1279-80, 1280 n.215 (explaining the
debate surrounding the role of subjectivity and gender in homicides resulting from battered
women syndrome); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181,
190 (2001) ("[B]ecause the bias caused by race is largely automatic, it may be difficult to
control directly, especially when cognitive resources are limited."); B. Keith Payne, Weapon
Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 287, 290 (2006) ("Race can bias snap judgments of whether a gun is present, and
that bias can coexist with fair-minded intentions."); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba
Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 314-15 (2012) (observ-
ing that individuals rely on stereotypes when assessing risk posed by other people).
253. See supra notes 32-70 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 71-160 and accompanying text.
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marcating lines of protection-constitutional and systematic-around
juvenile offenders. A child has the right to counse55 but not the right
to a jury. 25 6 A child may not be sentenced to death2 5 7 but can be tried
as an adult.2 5' The balance has always been tenuous, as notions of
childhood ebb toward vulnerability and flow toward predatory. The
modern jurisprudence of youth allows, simultaneously, the highest
rate of juvenile transfer,2 5 9 and a youth-oriented calculation of custo-
dy for Miranda purposes.2 6 0 Despite these seeming incongruities, the
recognition of difference and its significance for law lingers.
Neuroscience confirms what most folks already knew: kids are in
fact different; or more accurately, adolescents think differently than
adults. Adolescents' perceptions of risk, reward, and the value of peer
approval result from their distinct mental processes.2 6 ' The Court has
utilized science to bolster its youth-based Fifth and Eighth Amend-
ments jurisprudence.262 In each, the Court has created doctrine prem-
ised not on an individual defendant's characteristics, but on those
characteristics that span the category of youth. 2 6 3
The Court, however, has yet to expand these doctrines to the sub-
stantive realm of calculation of the defendant's state of mind. In-
stead, adult fact finders are left to assign a mental state to youthful
defendants based on the fact finder's, not the defendant's, perception
of the world. This seems an odd position given criminal law's simul-
taneous reliance on mens rea to assess culpability and its purported
aim to ascertain a defendant's actual, as opposed to imagined, mental
state.2 6 4
This Part offers a brief discussion of the value of neuroscientific
evidence in the determination of juvenile defendants' mental states.
To be clear, I do not contend that such evidence predicts or confirms
a particular thought at any given moment. Likewise, such scientific
evidence does not suggest that juveniles are incapable of forming
mental states or that youth dictates the whole-cloth creation of new
mens rea classifications. Rather, this Part suggests that evidence of
255. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1967).
256. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971).
257. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005).
258. See Brink, supra note 24, at 1557; Drinan, supra note 24, at 1793-94.
259. Id.
260. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011).
261. See supra notes 161-87 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
264. See Denno, Post-Freudian, supra note 216, at 608 (describing the Model Penal
Code's aim to determine actual, as opposed to imagined states of mind).
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adolescent thought processes are relevant to questions of guilt and
should guide inferential proof calculations.
A. It's Always All About Proof
At the end of the day, criminal law is about proof.265 Suspicions
may fester and swirl but without proof they are of little consequence.
Al Capone may have run a notorious crime syndicate, but the gov-
ernment could only prove tax fraud.266 For all the rumors and all the
whispered certainties of greater crimes, he went to jail for a tax vio-
lation.267 Proof, while a requisite for conviction, is also a complicated,
multilayered proposition.
At its base, proof requires evidence-some tangible demonstration
of what is sought to be proven.26 1 Investigators gather factual compo-
nents to support suspicions. Prosecutors process and interpret this
information in support of a charge. Judges sift through and interpret
the information again, culling the admissible from the inadmissible,
presenting the fact finder with only the most reliable and the most
relevant evidence. But in it all, evidence alone is not proof. And in
the end, only proof matters.
Presented the admissible evidence in the case, the judge or jury is
left to interpret its meaning in the context of the law. The means of
this interpretation may vary. Different criminal statutes require a
myriad of elements, from voluntary acts to attendant circumstances
to mental states to causation and results.26 1 While these elements
may vary, the law relies on a citizen-whether judge or juror-to
consider the evidence presented and determine if the elements are
proven. The citizen, in turn, relies on his or her own sense of the
world to lend meaning to the evidence.
An outstretched hand in a dark alley is either an illicit drug deal or
a handshake; a semi-coherent moan is either encouragement of, or re-
sistance to, a sexual advance; shouted words to "fuck up" a school prin-
cipal are either a promise of harm to come or meaningless bravado. It
all depends on who interprets them and how. The harmless is ren-
dered criminal or the criminal harmless in the mind of the fact finder.
265. It is also about regulation of behavior, but only after proof of an offense. See
DRESSLER, supra note 232, § 1.02 (describing proof requirements).
266. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583-84 (2005).
267. Id.
268. See Hubert W. Smith, Components of Proof in Legal Proceedings, 51 YALE L.J.
537, 562 (1942).
269. See Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense'"-Why Not?, 72
YALE L.J. 853, 853 (1963).
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On some level, the flexibility of interpretation is a critical part of
proof.270 Allowing the citizenry to weigh the meaning of evidence in-
jects substantive criminal law with a responsiveness and agility that
static law might otherwise lack.27' Through interpretation, evidence
is placed in context. The hand is outstretched in an alley littered with
the remnants of the drug trade. A small packet of drugs was tossed
as the police stormed the alley. The moaner is so inebriated she is
unaware of the man atop her who separated her from her friends
when he noticed she was unable to stand and was slurring her words.
The shouted words are those of a frustrated eleven-year-old who, feel-
ing unfairly accused by the principal, cries out what he fanaticizes
about doing to the offending adult.
The fact finder considers each of these facts and the context in
which they occurred. The context, in turn, promotes the accuracy of
the fact finder's ultimate decision.272 But in reaching a verdict, the
fact finder engages in one final, and ultimately decisive, act of inter-
pretation-he considers the evidence not only in the context of the
case but in the context of what the fact finder knows of the world.
The evidence takes on a legal meaning, previously absent, based on
the fact finder's own sense of what the law means and the signifi-
cance of the fact to that meaning.273 Based on this final act of inter-
pretation, the fact finder concludes that the outstretched hands trad-
ed drugs for cash; that the moan was a precursor to a rape; and that
the shouted words were not a threat.
The law, in turn, relies on the citizen-as-fact-finder's ability to lay
this larger, legally infused meaning atop any given set of facts. But
beyond this, it relies on the citizen's ability to ground this meaning in
some communal sense of what facts themselves signify. If the citizen
cannot do this, the verdict that emerges is foreign, discordant, inac-
curate, and unjust.2 7 4 Criminal law enforcement loses some, if not all,
of its value. The accusation is not truly proven but is rather the
product of misinterpreted or badly interpreted facts.
Of all the factual determinations fact finders are asked to make on
their road to a verdict, assessing the defendant's state of mind is a
fraught act of interpretation.2 75 Though classified as a "factual" de-
270. See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579, 581-83 (2014) (dis-
cussing citizen interpretation as a component of law making).
271. Id.
272. See Roth, supra note 5, at 1984-85.
273. See Carroll, supra note 270, at 583.
274. Id. at 615.
275. See Denno, Post-Freudian, supra note 216, at 605-06; Denno, Concocting Criminal
Intent, supra note 219, at 328.
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termination, what he defendant was thinking at any given moment
is more ephemeral than other binary factual questions.2 7' The de-
fendant stole the purse or he did not. The defendant shot the victim
or he did not. The defendant set he fire to the occupied structure or
he did not. But criminal law demands more than liability based on
act and cause alone.2 7 7 In all but the most exceptional cases, criminal
law requires the fact finder to assess what the defendant was think-
ing at the moment the purse was taken, the shot was fired, the fire
was set.2 7 1 What the defendant was thinking at that critical moment
may remain elusive, perhaps even to the defendant himself. So crim-
inal law asks fact finders to perform the near-impossible task of in-
ferring the defendant's thoughts from his acts.
In this, we ask jurors daily to engage in a multilayered fictional
interpretation of what the defendant must have been thinking, based
on what the fact finder imagines he, the fact finder, would have been
thinking had he found himself in the defendant's place. Even in the
best of circumstances this fictional construction and interpretation of
the defendant's thought process is complex. In the context of adoles-
cent defendants, it is further complicated when adult fact finders
seek to imagine or recreate what science informs us is a distinct and
foreign thought process.
In this search for the accurate interpretation of evidence, neuro-
science's conclusions about adolescent development fill a void in fact
finders' interpretive ability. These conclusions inform the fact finder
of the significance of given acts or circumstances to the adolescent
defendant. Such a perspective is not only distinct from an adult's, but
it may elude adult fact finders as they weigh evidence in the context
of their own view of the world.
For all their good intentions and efforts at accuracy, adult fact
finders may lack the ability to recall their own decisionmaking pro-
cess as a youth.2 7 9 They may recall foolish, dangerous, or even crimi-
nal decisions they made, but they may not recall why they made such
decisions. Did they intend their acts to produce a particular result?
Were their acts mere products of a failure to properly assess a risk?
Did they know and understand the probability of harm when they
committed them? Or do they simply remember and recognize the folly
of the choice once made? Even a confession may take on a different
276. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
277. Though early criminal law was premised on strict liability, by the sixth century
mental state elements were appearing with greater frequency. See Paul H. Robinson, A
Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 821-22 (1980).
278. See id. at 823-25.
279. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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meaning in the context of adolescent hought process.8 0 Is it an accu-
rate description of what the confessor did? Or is it a misguided at-
tempt to achieve some other reward?28'
In the context of criminal law, what the suspect thought matters
as much as what he did or what harm his action caused. What the
defendant thought drives the state of mind analysis, which serves as
a proxy for culpability.2 8 2 As a practical matter this means that even
if neuroscience cannot either predict future behavior or explain what
precisely a defendant knew or understood at a given moment in time,
it can offer an interpretive model through which a fact finder can ac-
curately assess the meaning of an adolescent defendant's actions and
words. The question that lingers is how?
B. Using Neuroscience to Guide Mental State Assessments
There are two mechanisms to guide a fact finder's evaluation of
evidence: first through the regulation of the evidence itself, and sec-
ond through the jury instructions that guide the interpretation of the
evidence. At their core, both are designed to ensure decisional accu-
racy.2 8 3 Evidentiary rules serve not only to exclude unreliable evi-
dence but also to lend context to allow for accurate assessment of the
reliability of the evidence admitted.2 8 4 Likewise, jury instructions
guide the fact finder's interpretation.2 8 5 Both offer a vehicle through
which neuroscience can be used to guide assessments of juvenile de-
fendants' mental states.2 8 6 While the discussion of these mechanisms
is grounded in and reference the theoretical and jurisprudential dis-
cussions of Parts I and II, it is designed to be practical. Put another
way, it is designed to move the discussion from how neuroscience
might be used, to how it should be used, and what that use would
look like in actual cases.
280. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52 (1967) (expressing doubts about the reliability of juve-
nile confessions); Symposium, Legal Issues Affecting Juveniles, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
578, 580 (2012) (estimating that juveniles falsely confess at a rate of two to three times
that of adults).
281. See Legal Issues Affecting Juveniles, supra note 280, at 582 (attributing false confes-
sion rates to mistaken beliefs that confessing will allow the juvenile to "go home"); B.J. Casey,
Rebecca M. Jones & Leah H. Somerville, Braking and Accelerating of the Adolescent Brain, 21
J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 21, 26 (2011) (noting adolescent bias toward short-term gain).
282. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (linking the state of
mind element to culpability determinations).
283. See STEIN, supra note 4, at 23; Roth, supra note 5, at 1984-85.
284. See Roth, supra note 5, at 1984-85.
285. See Robert C. Power, Reasonable and Other Doubts: The Problem of Jury Instruc-
tions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 45, 54-56 (1999).
286. This is not to say that these are the only vehicles through which such evidence




The most obvious means to introduce fact finders to the science of
adolescent brain development is through the introduction of expert
testimony. Such testimony could occur in two forms: an expert could
evaluate a particular defendant and testify as to her cognitive pro-
cesses, or an expert could speak more broadly to what is generally
known of adolescent brain development and its corresponding thought
processes.2 8 8 Before considering the introduction of expert testimo-
ny-either specific or general-it is worth noting that "generalized"
expert testimony presents some fundamental evidentiary challenges.
First, generalized evidence is likely to draw relevancy and Rule
702 objections. As discussed in Part III, relevancy seeks to limit ad-
missible evidence to only that demonstrating the probability of a ma-
terial fact.2 8 9 Trials, after all, are narrow narratives. To push for the
admission of generalized information surrounding trends in adoles-
cent thought process is not only to push to widen the story told at tri-
al, but it is to push against the notion that the significance of youth is
intuitively knowable.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702290 and its state law analogs permit
expert testimony based on the premise that the expert is able to ex-
plain a matter that exceeds the layperson's understanding."2 9 Rule
702 works in conjunction with relevancy rules to prevent offering an
expert pedigree to information that is commonly knowable.
In developing its age-based Fifth and Eighth Amendments juris-
prudence, the Court has stressed not only that juveniles were differ-
ent from adults, but that that difference was readily apparent. Roper
concluded that the difference between a child and adult was based on
what "any parent knows."292 In J.D.B., Justice Sotomayor defended
287. This type of direct evidence of the defendant's idiosyncratic condition would be
akin to evidentiary presentations made in insanity or diminished capacity defenses.
288. While not precisely analogous, this type of generalized evidence would be similar
to evidence presented in battered women and child defenses that seek to provide (along
with evidence of the defendant's abuse) general information about cycles of violence, as
opposed to the defendant's particular perception of that cycle.
289. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
290. In addition to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. established gate-keeping functions for determining the reliability and admissibil-
ity of scientific evidence. See 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993). Daubert required that scientific
evidence be (1) testable; (2) subject to peer review and publication; (3) articulate its error
rate; (4) have a controlling standard; and (5) generally accepted. Id. at 592-95. In addition,
the evidence could be excluded if other factors counseled towards exclusion. Id. at 595.
Though it is beyond the scope of this Article, expert testimony surrounding adolescent
brain development in question likely meets the criteria articulated in Daubert.
291. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (limiting the admission of expert testimony).
292. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
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categorical classifications based on age, noting that "officers and
judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental psy-
chology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cul-
tural anthropology to account for a child's age. They simply need the
common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and nei-
ther is an adult."2 9 3
At first blush, the Court's frequent invocation of the intuitive na-
ture of the difference between adolescents and adults creates both
relevancy and Rule 702 dilemmas. If adolescent thought process is
known to adults based on their former status as children (or current
status as parents of children), then fact finders should be able to ac-
cess such knowledge without the assistance of an expert. In fact, the
introduction of generalized expert testimony would neither render the
mental state more or less likely in a particular defendant nor would it
provide the fact finder with knowledge they did not already possess.
But first impressions of the value of evidence can be deceiving. As
the dissent in J.D.B. noted, it is not the biological fact of youth that is
significant to a Miranda inquiry, but the effect of that fact on percep-
tions of custody.2 9 4 Likewise, for a mental state analysis, it is the dis-
tinct adolescent hought process that matters. Neuroscience suggests
not only that these thought processes are both generalizable across
an age-based set,2 9 5 but also that they are less intuitively accessible
to an adult fact finder than Justice Sotomayor might suggest. Justice
Alito noted that in the context of any given case, an officer would
need to distinguish between the perceptions of a 13-year-old and that
of a 7-year-old.2 9 6 This creates challenges as "judges attempt to put
themselves in the shoes of the average 16-year-old, or 15-year-old, or
13-year-old, as the case may be."29 7 This perspective and its subtle
impact on notions of custody were not matters of common sense but
rather required expert knowledge to decipher.2 9 1
In J.D.B., Justice Alito couched these concerns in terms of the ero-
sion of Miranda's clarity.299 He warned that officers and courts will be
left unable to properly assess the significance of age with regard to
the custody analysis without the assistance of expert testimony. Put
another way, Justice Alito did not contest that traits were shared
293. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 279-80 (2011).
294. See id. at 293 (Alito, J., dissenting).
295. See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 14, at 801.
296. See J.D.B., 564 U.S at 293 (Alito, J., dissenting).
297. Id.
298. See id. at 294 (noting that this new analysis demands "much more" than common
sense).
299. Id. at 293.
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across age strata, but did contest that the significance of such traits
was intuitively knowable. In this, Justice Alito's dissent in J.D.B.
makes a strong case that generalized evidence is both relevant and
necessary to ensure accuracy in the assessment of a juvenile's
thought process.
The nuance of the difference age makes-and how it affects a
child's decisions-is both relevant and a less-intuitive assessment
than the majority might suggest. It may be an assessment hat ex-
ceeds the ordinary ability of a fact finder.3 0 0 Despite the dizzying pace
of science's understanding of adolescence and the shared intuitive
sense of difference, a forty-five-year-old judge is unlikely to remem-
ber not only what she did as a thirteen-year-old, but why. Events
thirty-plus years in the past may not only present as hazy to the for-
ty-five-year-old judge, but the judge may lack the ability to recollect
or recreate the thought processes that fueled those events in the first
place.
In the context of Miranda, this gap between what is readily ap-
parent and what lurks beneath the adolescent surface may be less
significant. It may be enough, as Justice Sotomayor noted, for an of-
ficer to understand broadly that in the life of thirteen-year-old J.D.B.,
removal from class and questioning by officers was both coercive and
custodial. In this context, common sense may suffice. Despite the dis-
sent's warnings, the nature of the Miranda analysis itself suggests
that such a common-sense assessment may be sufficient. Miranda
requires officers to make a decision in situa.3 0 1 Under any Miranda
analysis, they are required to place themselves in the position of
their subject and consider the custodial nature of the encounter.3 0 2 If
the encounter is assessed to be custodial in nature, they must offer
the warning.303
The elusiveness of officer precision of which Justice Alito warns
seems both inherent in a Miranda-type decision and easily guarded
against by "over warning" rather than "under warning." In other
words, the quick nature of the Miranda decision may indeed lead to
error when interrogators fail to properly assess the suspect's percep-
tion of custody. But if the officer is unsure about the suspect's age or
the significance of that age to perceptions of custody, the officer can
300. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
301. See Symposium, Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 135, 151-52 (2004) (noting that Miranda requires police officers to make
"quick decisions" in the field or at the stationhouse).
302. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966); see also Stansbury v. Cali-
fornia, 511 U.S. 318, 323-34 (1994).
303. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
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remedy any risk of suppression by offering a Miranda warning prior
to interrogation.304
In this sense, the Miranda analysis is very different than the
mens rea analysis for two reasons. First, by its nature, Miranda re-
quires a "split second" style decision in the field. In contrast, like all
elements, proof of a mental state encompasses the calculation of the
defendant's state of mind as ascertained by analysis of the evidence
presented in the case under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
As a result, Justices Alito and Sotomayor may both be right-the
analysis of adolescence is both the product of common sense based on
the common experience of youth and the product of more nuanced
analysis that assesses the significance of the youth they can observe
in the defendant in the context of the facts of the case they have
heard and seen.
Second, Miranda is different from the mental state element in
terms of the ultimate result. The failure to properly Mirandize a sus-
pect may result in the suppression of statements or evidence ac-
quired in the course of improper interrogation.0 5 In contrast, failure
to properly calibrate or instruct on the assessment of the defendant's
state of mind may produce not only a verdict that is inaccurate but
also one that may elude substantive criminal law's aims to assign
culpability based on the defendant's state of mind. Whatever high
stakes may exist in the context of Miranda increase in the context of
a mental state analysis. This would seem to suggest that expert wit-
ness testimony on what is generally known of adolescent thought
processes is, in fact, relevant and necessary.
The admissibility of the evidence, however, is only half the battle,
and the second half at that. In many jurisdictions, the prospect of lo-
cating an expert and persuading her to testify may be a daunting
proposition. Not only may the neuroscientist not be available in the
community where the case is pending, but funds for the expert may
not be available, particularly for indigent defendants.3 0 6 This dilem-
304. Id. at 444 (requiring warning only if the defendant is in custody when subjected to
interrogation).
305. Id.
306. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84-85 (1985), the Supreme Court held that indi-
gent defendants had a right to experts for their defense. Despite this grant, lack of funds
often results in indigent defendants being unable to procure an expert or only being able to
choose among limited experts. See Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of Expert
Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1998) ("Courts, as gatekeepers,
must be aware of how difficult it can be for some parties-particularly indigent criminal
defendants-to obtain an expert to testify. The fact that one side may lack adequate re-
sources with which to fully develop its case is a constant problem."); see also Paul C. Gian-
nelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2004); John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indi-
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ma of a lack of funding becomes more salient when one considers that
juveniles themselves tend not to have funds and, given the high rate
of prosecution of indigent juveniles, they may not have access to
funds either.30 7 As will be discussed momentarily, jury instructions
may serve as a means of providing the necessary guidance to the fact
finder without having to produce an expert witness. The availability
of an alternative method of communicating the desired information is
not to say that this method alone is either best or sufficient. It is,
however, to say that in a system in which funds are limited and free
experts are rare, it is better than providing no information.
2. Jury Instructions/Judicial Motions
As helpful as expert testimony may be in offering the fact finder
insight into the juvenile's developmental capacities and decisionmak-
ing processes, it alone is not sufficient. Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b) and its state analogs prohibit experts in criminal cases from
"stat[ing] an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have
a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime
charged or of a defense."3 0 8 The Rule concludes: "[t]hose matters are
for the trier of fact alone."3 0 9 This creates an evidentiary disjoinder of
sorts. The expert's testimony is relevant because it informs the fact
finder of what is known of the difference in decisionmaking processes
and brain development between juveniles and adults, but the expert is
unable to explain why that matters to the jury's calculation of mens
rea in terms of whether or not the evidence presented in fact suggests
that the juvenile achieved the requisite mens rea. The evidentiary rule
and, indeed, due process leaves that question to the fact finder.3 10
Because this issue is left to the fact finder, jury instructions (or a
judicial motion, in cases where the fact finder is a judge) regarding
what is known of adolescent brain development are required regard-
less of whether or not the court is willing to admit expert testimony.
Such instructions serve to properly orient the fact finder in his inter-
pretation of the evidence.3 11
gent Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326,
1326-28 (1986).
307. This dilemma is evident as courts attempt to provide Miller hearings with experts
for juvenile defendants. See Stephen K. Harper, Resentencing Juveniles Convicted of Homi-
cide Post-Miller, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2014, at 34.
308. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
309. Id.
310. See id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970) (holding due process requires
the fact finder to determine whether all elements of an offense have been proven).
311. See Power, supra note 285, at 56.
2017] 53
54 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
As a general matter, jury instructions guide the fact finder not
only in terms of law but also in terms of acceptable interpretive
norms.3 1 2 In the context of a juvenile defendant's mental state, such
instructions serve to remind the fact finder that despite their intui-
tive sense of "difference" between a juvenile and adult, and perhaps
their own fond memories of a misspent youth, calculation of guilt re-
quires more.
Ideally, such instructions would be multifaceted and would in-
clude reference to the fact that adolescents' brains are not fully de-
veloped in the areas that control impulses, foresee consequences, and
temper emotions. As a result, the instructions would remind the fact
finder that adolescents act impetuously with little thought or consid-
eration of consequences.3 1 3 Such attributes of adolescence must be
considered in interpreting evidence of the defendant's mental state.
The instructions proposed below include first a general instruction
regarding the difference between adult and adolescent thought pro-
cesses. This instruction would serve as a guide for the juror as he in-
terpreted the evidence before him. Such an instruction would be ap-
propriate regardless of whether an objective or subjective state of
mind3 1 4 was utilized and regardless of whether or not an expert testi-
fied. The instruction acknowledges that while there is a degree of in-
tuition about the difference between juvenile and adult thought pro-
cesses, a more nuanced understanding of adolescent brain develop-
ment is required for assessments of mental states. The instruction
could be given as both a preliminary instruction and at the conclu-
sion of the trial. It might state:
Anyone who remembers being a teenager, who has been the parent
or caretaker of a teenager, or who has observed adolescent behav-
ior, knows intuitively what scientific research shows that adoles-
cents do not think or behave like adults; their brains are not yet
fully developed in the areas that control impulses, ability to fore-
see the consequences of their actions, and to temper their emo-
tions. As a result, an adolescent may overvalue a reward or under-
value a risk in making a decision. What may appear to be a logical
312. Id. (noting judges teach jurors the law through instructions).
313. For example, such an instruction might state: In determining whether a
child/adolescent has acted reasonably you must/may consider that a lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults. These
attributes/qualities of youth often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.
314. Objective states of mind consider the defendant's mental state in comparison to
that of a "reasonable man." In contrast, subjective states of mind consider the defendant's
actual mental state. The Model Penal Code breaks the mental state element into three
subjective states of mind (purpose, knowledge and recklessness) and one objective state of




consequence of a decision to you, an adult, may elude an adoles-
cent entirely or may only become apparent after the consequences
are realized. These differences are "normal" characteristics of ado-
lescence and do not represent a defect or deficiency. As such, you
may consider this difference as you listen to the evidence in this
case or make findings based on the evidence in this case.
Following such a generalized instruction, the court should provide
a specific instruction depending on the mental state that must be
proven. For crimes requiring purpose or knowledge, the court may
instruct on the significance of neuroscience in assessing the factual
presence of the requisite mental state.315 In offering this instruction,
the court guides the jury by informing it that a child who shouts that
he will "fuck up" a school principal may have a distinct understand-
ing of the significance of those words than his adult counterpart. Ac-
cordingly, an assessment of whether or not he intended to place the
school principal in fear with his utterance must be made in the con-
text of the child's own perception. A jury instruction in such a case
might state:
A deliberate act is one "characterized by or resulting from careful
and thorough consideration' or one 'characterized by awareness of
the consequences." The defendant here is an adolescent, and one of
the differences between adults and adolescents is that adolescents'
brains are not fully developed in the areas that control impulses,
foresee consequences, and temper emotions. Adolescents are suscep-
tible to acting impetuously with little thought or consideration of
consequences, a fact shown by brain development research as well
as common sense. You must/may consider these attributes of adoles-
cence when determining whether the defendant acted intentionally.
For offenses relying on a "reasonableness" standard, a standard
that in other contexts requires the fact finder make his assessment
from the perspective of the defendant,316 the jury instruction should
remind the fact finder that this reasonableness hould not be calcu-
lated from an adult perspective, but from a reasonable child's per-
spective.317 This recalibrated perspective should contemplate the ado-
lescent's lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility,
failure to predict the causal connections between action and harm,
315. The Model Penal Code states people act purposely if it is their "conscious object to
engage in conduct . . . or to cause . . . a result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Am. LAw
INST. 1985). Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts knowingly if "he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause [the required] result." Id. at
§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
316. For a discussion of jury instructions that take into account the defendant's percep-
tion, see Lee, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 252, at 478-81.
317. Akin to J.D.B.'s reasonable child standard. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S.
261, 277-78 (2011).
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and susceptibility to negative influences. For example, such an in-
struction might state:
In determining whether a child/adolescent has acted reasonably,
you must/may consider that a lack of maturity and an underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in
adults. These attributes/qualities of youth often result in impetu-
ous and ill-considered actions and decisions.318
Alternative language in such instructions might include:
* The questions of the defendant's/juvenile's intent, as opposed to
an adult, must be decided with consideration of what we know
about adolescents of similar age and development.
* Special caution must be taken when determining whether the
juvenile acted with the intent required for this offense.
* Adolescents are susceptible to acting impetuously with little
thought or consideration of consequences, a fact shown by brain
development research as well as common sense.
* Adolescents' decisions often reflect an inability to consider their
options and appreciate consequences adequately.
* Adolescents often fail to appreciate the risks associated with
their actions and have unreasonable beliefs that their actions
are unlikely to cause harm.
Drawing heavily from the Court's decisions in the Roper line of
cases and in J.D.B., the language in each of these proposed instruc-
tions serves to properly orient the fact finder in order to assess the
defendant's mental state accurately. In this sense, such proposed in-
structions mirror those already permitted for defenses that rely on
the defendant's particular perspective for their viability and serve to
guide the fact finder towards decisional accuracy.
Both the use of expert testimony and the proposed jury instruc-
tions regarding adolescent brain development serve to promote the
underlying aims of criminal law: to convict and punish based on the
defendant's degree of culpability as determined by his state of mind.
Given criminal law's strong reliance on inference to make such a
mens rea assessment, and given both the Court's and the scientific
community's acknowledgment that adolescent thought processes are
distinct from adult thought processes, such evidence and instructions
318. Additional instructions regarding the significance of peer influence or impulsivity
could likewise be constructed. For example, the jury could be informed that: "Adolescents
routinely travel in groups with no nefarious intent and this fact should be considered in
your deliberations." See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) ("[J]uveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure."). Or that: "Juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their
own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from certain settings." See id.
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serve a critical function. They properly orient the fact finder to en-
sure that inferences are accurate and that verdicts are based on what
actually happened, as opposed to what might have happened.
V. CONCLUSION
Frequently, criminal law relies on inference to prove mental
states, as much out of necessity as out of a recognition that fact find-
ers inevitably engage in acts of interpretation in reaching verdicts.
This Article argues that in the context of juvenile defendants such
reliance on inference is fundamentally flawed insofar as it fails to
account for the distinctive thought processes of adolescent actors. Re-
cent developments in neuroscience confirm this difference. The im-
pulsive, risk-taking, reward centered, consequence blind existence
that is adolescence is both a shared rite of passage and a lost moment
for the adult fact finders. While a juror or a judge may remember
youth, he will not remember the decisionmaking processes that drove
his daily adolescent existence. Therefore, as criminal law asks him to
sit in judgment of juvenile defendants, it asks him to perform the impos-
sible task of placing himself back in time into the mind of an adolescent.
Without guidance on adolescent brain development and its corre-
sponding implications for mental state analysis, fact finders risk
misaligned interpretive models and decision inaccuracies. Proposed
use of expert testimony and jury instructions seek to orient the fact
finder properly, and so to achieve criminal law's purported goal of
discerning the defendant's actual state of mind.
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